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Abstract 
In this thesis, two-sector models are constructed to explore resource 
allocational and welfare effects of an exogenous change in capital tax under 
imperfect competition and unemployment. Within this f ramework, there are 
traded and non-traded sectors. Both of them utilize two factors of 
production: labor and capital. The supply of labor is fixed while that of 
capital depends wholly on the foreign capital inflows which are subject to 
capital tax. Four analytical models are used to capture the effects of an 
increase in capital tax on outputs, foreign capital, unemployment and 
welfare when different distortions are introduced. Firstly, for the sake of 
making comparison, a two-sector model without distortions is constructed. 
Secondly, another analytical model is used to explore the effects of an 
increase in capital tax on welfare and outputs when distortion is introduced 
to the market structure. It is done by assuming that the non-traded sector is 
operated by a monopolist and that the traded sector is under perfect 
competit ion. It is conveyed that under imperfect competit ion, an optimal 
capital tax is desired to maximize welfare. Next , the third analytical model 
appears when sectoral unemployment exists in the labor market. A novel 
result that an increase in capital tax on inf lows of foreign capital brings 
about a detrimental effect to the domestic welfare is derived for the 
Hams-Toda ro economy. Finally, the fourth variation of the model is used by 
assuming that sectoral unemployment exists in the labor market and that the 
non-traded sector is under imperfect competition. With the imposition of 
capital tax, the domestic welfare is harmed to a greater extent after the 
introduction of imperfect competi t ion to the Harris-Todaro economy. 
i 
Although an increase in capital tax makes sectoral unemployment become 
more serious no matter what the market structure is, the coexistence of 
sectoral unemployment and imperfect competit ion may lessen or increase 
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The effects of capital taxes on the international allocation of capital 
Trade appeared as long as h u m a n beings existed. People simply cannot 
p roduce all the goods they want due to l imited resources and manpower . 
Exchange has to take place to enable everyone to get commodi t ies they 
desire. The most simplified fo rm of exchange is the barter system under 
wh ich people exchange for others ' goods in the cost of dwindl ing 
consumpt ion of goods they produced. Starting f r o m nineteenth century, 
l i terature about trade models , which describe the pattern of trade, appeared. 
T h e Ricardian model (1817) is the basic f o rm of trade model，which 
conveys the idea that countries will completely specialize in p roduc ing 
goods that they have comparat ive advantages than other countries. Hav ing 
compara t ive advantages in producing a good means that one can p roduce it 
at a lower cost than the others do. 
In the twentieth century, voluminous trade models appeared. The two 
representat ive ones are the Heckscher-Ohl in model wh ich is originally 
fo rmula ted by Heckscher (1919), f leshed out by Ohlin (1933), and re f ined 
by Samuelson (1948, 1949，1953) and the specif ic factor mode l wh ich has 
b e c o m e important to international t rade theory af ter the reintroduct ion into 
the literature by Jones (1971) and Sameulson (1971). The Heckscher -Ohl in 
mode l states that a country will export commodi t ies that use its relatively 
abundant resources intensively. For the specif ic factor model , the ma in 
result is that an increase in the price of a sector will increase the real re turn 
to the factor specif ic to that sector whi le lower that of the fac tor specif ic to 
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other sectors and the effect on real return to mobile factor is ambiguous. 
Traditional trade models contribute mainly to the trade pattern. They 
provide explanations for the puzzling phenomenon that countries should 
interact with each other to get the goods they need instead of producing 
everything they desire. Commodi ty trade has been the core of international 
trade in the nineteenth century. Most of the studies investigate different 
t rade policies such as tariffs, quotas or voluntary export restraints for 
international trade of commodities. N o light has been shed on factor 
mobili ty until Mundell (1957) presented the idea that trade in commodit ies 
and factor movements are substitutes. H e argued that unequal factor 
endowments will lead to a reduction in commodity trade, and the relatively 
low priced factor in each country will be that country 's abundant factor. The 
existence of factor movements is to eliminate unequal factor prices. Capital, 
a quite mobile factor, can be subject to taxation of a receiving country. 
Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1993) have investigated the effect of capital 
taxation on welfare under trade liberalization and perfect competit ion. They 
prove that capital taxation is in fact welfare-reducing under those scenarios. 
However , there is still a lack of literature about the welfare effect under 
capital taxation when productions are under imperfect competition. It has 
been claimed that welfare can be maximized within an economy if it is 
under f ree trade but this result can only be valid when the assumption that 
all production activities are under perfect competit ion is held. W h e n it 
comes to imperfect competit ion, the trade patterns derived f r o m those 
representative trade models cease to be true and so is the optimal trade 
policy. It will be desirable to investigate wel fare issues when industries are 
under imperfect competition. 
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The problems investigated in the literature have a very unrealistic 
assumption. That is, the labor market is always under full employment . 
However, full employment exists only in theoretical models. We will 
introduce unemployment by imposing a rigid minimum wage in one sector 
while letting that in another sector flexible so that unemployment exists only 
in one sector. This phenomenon is discussed in the so called Harris-Todaro 
type of model (1970). To be specific，we will investigate the effect of capital 
taxes on welfare when there is Harris-Todaro unemployment and production 
activities are under both perfect and imperfect competition. 
Before investigating the core problem: the effect of capital taxation 
on welfare, we will provide an overview on some related studies in Chapter 
2. The effects of capital taxes on welfare under perfect competi t ion and full 
employment is presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the effects of capital 
taxes on welfare is investigated under imperfect competit ion and full 
employment . In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6，we introduce unemployment into 
the model. The effects of capital taxation on unemployment and welfare as 
well as consequent policy implications will be examined under perfect and 




Countr ies engage in international t rade for two basic reasons and each 
of which contr ibutes to their gain f r o m trade. First，countries are d i f fe ren t in 
economic attributes f rom each other. They can benef i t by p roduc ing m o r e of 
the goods they do relatively well . Second, t rade helps to achieve economies 
of scale in product ion by producing a larger quanti ty of a na r rower range o f 
goods with lower costs than if it tries to produce everything. It wou ld be 
crucial to de termine the trade pattern to de termine what countr ies should 
produce. So, w e first provide a li terature rev iew on three representat ive 
t rade mode ls wh ich are related to the trade pattern. 
2.1 Trade Models 
a. Ricardian model 
T h e Ricard ian theory of compara t ive advantage (Ricardo 1817) 
involves two countr ies , two goods and one fac tor of product ion, namely 
labor wh ich are complete ly mobi le be tween al ternative uses wi th in a country. 
It demons t ra tes countr ies will export and comple te ly special ize in p roduc ing 
commodi t i e s that they have compara t ive advantage. 
b. Heckscher-Ohlin model 
T h e Heckscher -Ohl in mode l was originally fo rmula ted by Hecksche r 
(1919)，fleshed out by Ohl in (1933) , and ref ined by Samue l son (1948，1949， 
1953). It is a mode l of international t rade in which compara t ive advan tage 
der ives f r o m di f fe rences in relative fac tor e n d o w m e n t s across countries. 
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c. Specific Factor model 
The specif ic factor model was developed by Paul Samuelson and Rona ld 
Jones (1971). This model is with a single specif ic factor in each industry and 
one mobi le factor be tween sectors. It extends the original Ricard ian mode l 
by assuming that the marginal product of labor falls with output. T h e ma in 
result is that an increase in the price of a sector will increase the real re turn 
to the factor specif ic to that sector, while lower those of factors specif ic to 
other sectors. The effect on real return to the mobi le factor is ambiguous . 
2.2 Policy Implications 
International trade economists have argued that an freer t rade reg ime is 
important for economic development . This v i ew is supported by empir ical 
observat ion that countries which are highly protected for a long per iod of 
t ime appear to suffer significantly. Several empirical studies (Dollar 1992, 
Edwards 1993，Sachs and Warner 1995) show that t rade l iberalization can 
encourage growth and hence improve wel fa re under perfect competi t ion. 
M o r e recent studies such as Stoforos and Chrysos tomos (2003) c la im that 
t rade liberalization has an immediate negat ive effect on product ion, whi le a 
posi t ive e f fec t will b e exerted on demand. Welfare analysis results suggest a 
s ignif icant negat ive effect in producer surplus, but an overall posit ive t rend 
fo r the net welfare ef fect in the case of the t rade liberalization scenario. 
2.3 Factor Mobility 
Factor movemen t s be tween nat ions have not d rawn attention from 
literature until Mundel l (1957) presented the idea that t rade in commodi t ies 
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and factor movements are substitutes. He conveyed that unequal factor 
endowments will lead to a reduction in commodity trade and the relatively 
low priced factor in each country will be that country's abundant factor. The 
existence of factor movements is to eliminate the unequal prices. There is 
substantial and more recent literature on the relationship between goods 
trade and factor mobility (Markusen 1983, Svensson 1984, Ethier and 
Svensson 1986). Markusen (1983) investigates factor movements by 
assuming that factor movements and commodity trade are complements. 
Svensson (1984) deals with trade pattern in both goods and factors when 
some factors are traded. Ethier and Svensson (1986) extend the results of 
Svensson (1984) who deals only with marginal factor endowments . For 
investigation on welfare for factor mobility, K e m p (1962) and Balogh and 
Streeton (1960) have showed that f ree capital f low will enhance welfare. 
2.4 Imperfect Competition and Trade Policy 
Traditional trade theories mentioned above are based on the assumption 
of perfect competition. Relaxing this assumption, some of the industries are 
under imperfect competition, may make most of the traditional trade 
theories to become invalid. Brander (1981) was the first one to claim that 
when international market is characterized by oligopolistic competit ion, the 
pattern of trade is indeed intra-industry trade rather than inter-industry trade. 
A number of later papers focus on the profit-shifting motive for t rade policy 
under oligopoly. Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985), Venables (1985), Harris 
(1985), Eaton and Grossman (1988), Hwang and Mai (1988), Mai and 
H w a n g (1988) and others. Brander and Spencer (1984) point out in 
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particular that, although the optimal response to foreign monopoly and 
oligopoly is usually a tariff, a specific subsidy will be optimal if demand is 
sufficiently convex to the origin. Moreover, Brander and Spencer (1985) 
develop a model in which one domestic f irm and one foreign f i rm produce a 
homogenous good which competes in a third country market. They conduct 
a Coumot-Nash equilibrium and find that the domestic government has a 
unilateral incentive to offer an export subsidy to the domestic firm. All these 
studies confine themselves to a discussion of final product markets only. 
Later studies paid attention to imperfectly competit ive intermediate 
input markets appeared. For example, Rodrik and Yoon (1989) consider 
government policy towards vertically related markets in the context of a 
general equilibrium model in which both intermediate and final products are 
produced by competit ive industries. Spencer and Jones (1991) use a model 
be tween an integrated f i rm and an unintegrated firm to discuss the 
possibility that export taxes on both the intermediate input and the final 
product would be desirable. 
2.5 Capital Taxation 
It is wel l -known that the optimal policy is f ree trade and perfect capital 
mobility. But if capital is taxed for some reasons, the effects of trade 
policies such as tariffs, import quotas and voluntary export restraints will be 
changed. The interdependence between tariffs and capital taxes has been 
examined in a Heckscher-Ohlin context by K e m p (1966) and Jones (1967). 
Casas (1985) derives the second-best capital tax (subsidy) in the presence of 
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tar i f fs wi thin the specif ic-factor model , and N e a r y (1988a)^ ex tends these 
results in a more general model where t raded goods and fac tors are t reated 
symmetrical ly. Hatz ipanayotou and Michae l (1993) invest igate the e f fec t o f 
capital taxes on wel fa re under t rade l iberalization and per fec t compet i t ion. 
Jones (1967) discusses the wel fa re e f fec t wi thin the s tandard two-country, 
two-commodi ty mode l of t rade in which labor are immobi le internationally 
bu t capital is mobi l e be tween countries. H e conveys that w h e n the fore ign 
country is complete ly special ized and there are tar iffs in the h o m e country, 
the h o m e country has to levy a posi t ive t ax on capital f lows , whe the r it is a 
net lender or borrower. However , w h e n the product ion is incomple te 
special ized, the optimal tax rate is positive if and only if the re a re tar i f fs 
(subsidies) and the exportables are capital ( labor) intensive. T h e we l fa re 
e f fec t is also investigated under t rade l iberalization by Jones and h e f inds 
that w h e n the foreign country is incompletely special ized, the sign pat tern of 
the opt imal tax on capital f lows is the same as that w h e n there are tariffs . 
However , subsidies should be imposed to capital expor ts if the fo re ign 
country is comple te ly specialized. Hauf le r (1996) invest igates t he taxa t ion 
pol icy on capital income within a two-sector mode l wi th specif ic fac tors and 
shows that a source-based t ax on capital i ncome should exist t o m a x i m i z e 
wel fare . Weichenr ieder and Dehe j i a (2001) s h o w that be ing a net impor ter 
o f capital , the country wil l a lways gain f r o m ‘tariff j u m p i n g ' direct 
inves tment if mobi l e capital is subjected to taxation. Lai (2001) con f i rms 
that taxes on the rate of return on fore ign capital are wel fare- increas ing if 
1 The ranking of second-best tariffs and capital taxes refers to cases where other policy 
instruments, such as production and consumption taxes or subsidies, are not available. If 
they are available, then the ranking of the second-best choices may change (i.e. third best or 
worse). 
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the marke t structure is imperfect ly competi t ive. 
C h a o and Yu (1992) demonst ra te that the result der ived by K h a n and 
Naqv i (1983)，a reduct ion in the capital rental differential a lways improve 
we l f a re despi te the presence of a rigid wage, does not hold if sector-specif ic 
fac tor (i.e. land) is introduced into the two-good, two fac tor Harr i s -Todaro 
model . Michae l and Mil ler (1994) investigate the opt imal policy by 
in t roducing capital mobil i ty into the Harr is-Todaro economy. T h e y s h o w 
that capi tal subsidy in agricultural sector raises social welfare . Michae l and 
Hatz ipanayotou (1990) demonst ra te that the optimal pol icy towards capital 
is a lways a subsidy under t rade l iberalization and sector-specif ic 
unemployment . C h a o and Yu (1997) demonst ra te that a subsidy on fore ign 
capital coupled wi th a tariff can be joint ly opt imal in the h o m e country. 
However , if there exists a tax credit system, subsidy on fore ign capital m a y 
not b e optimal . 
2.6 Unemployment 
T h e coexis tence o f widespread urban unemploymen t and rura l -urban 
migra t ion is observed mainly in the Third World economies . Harr is and 
Todaro (1970) deve loped a two-sector model to explain this p h e n o m e n o n by 
in t roducing a labor al location m e c h a n i s m under wh ich the actual rural w a g e 
is equal to the expec ted urban wage. This se tup d i f fers from the original 
s tandard rigid-wage mode l s o f t rade theory ( for example , Bhagwat i 1968， 
Johnson 1965, Lefeber 1971, Brencher 1971) in a way that unemploymen t 
resul t ing from a m i n i m u m wage is speci f ic to the urban sector. Its original 
vers ion a s sumes bo th sectors util ize t w o factors of p roduct ion wi th labor 
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being the only mobile factor, while there is one specific factor to each of 
them, namely capital to the manufactured sector and land to the agricultural 
sector. The Harris-Todaro model (HT model) has been the subject of 
intensive inquiry in both trade and development literature. It provides 
solutions for the puzzling phenomenon that urban unemployment exists 
inevitably. In the context of this model, Harris and Todaro analyze two 
policies: (1) a wage subsidy policy in the manufacturing sector and (2) a 
labor-mobility restriction policy. They claimed that both polices are 
necessary to attain the optimal first best solution. 
Recently, three elegant extensions of the Harris-Todaro model (1970) 
have been offered in the development theory literature. The first, Corden 
and Findlay (1975), incorporates capital mobility in a reformulated version 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1974) of the Harris-Todaro model. The other two, 
Stiglitz (1974) and Calvo (1978), remain in a world of immobile capital but 
make the wage in the urban sector endogenous. Stiglitz (1974) focuses on 
labor-turnover considerations and Calvo (1978) emphasizes a trade union 
operat ing under one of two behavioral hypotheses. Khan (1980) looks at all 
these contributions from the perspective of the Heckscher-Ohlin- Samuelson 
trade model characterized by two distortions: (a) equality of expected 
nominal wages rather than actual nominal wages and (b) the determination 
of the nominal urban wage through an exogenous funct ion of the rural wage， 
the unemployment rate and the rental rate. 
The restriction on capital mobility in the H-T model is released by 
Corden and Findlay (1975). It provides an extension of the model to permit 
capital mobility be tween the two sectors in response to any differential in 
the return on capital, which enables the model to be more applicable to the 
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real world. Af ter the release of the immobile capital restriction, Corden and 
Findlay (1975) explores policy implications and effects of economic 
expansion such as an increase in capital stock in each of the two versions. 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) suggest that a un i form wage subsidy 
to both sectors or a wage subsidy to manufactur ing sector plus a production 
subsidy to agricultural sector will yield the optimal, first best solution. 
Yabuuchi (1993) introduces international capital mobili ty into the 
Harris-Todaro model and examines the effectiveness of some policy tools. 
The main message is that a wage subsidy in manufactur ing and a tariff are 
no longer effective to improve welfare, whi le a wage subsidy in agriculture 
remains valid under the assumption of international capital mobility. This is 
in sharp contrast to the result obtained from the original Harris-Todaro 
model. 
Khan (1982) investigates social opportunity costs of labor and capital 
in the context of distortion of Harris-Todaro unemployment when capital is 
intersectorally mobile and immobile. The results are that when capital is 
intersectorally mobile, the market wage and market rental correctly measure 
the social opportunity cost of labor and capital in traditional Harris-Todaro 
model and there is no opportunity of immiserizing growth. However , when 
it is no longer the case, there is a possibility of negative social opportunity 
costs and immiserizing growth. 
The Bhagwati-Johnson paradox (1968, 1973), which says that capital 
accumulat ion leads to immiserization in the presence of a distortionary tariff 
are well-known; see Tan (1969)，Bertranda and Flatters (1971). This result 
has recently been sharpened to say that a tariff- induced capital inf low 
always leads to immiserization if the country imports the capital intensive 
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commodi ty and foreign capital receives the full value of its marginal 
product; see Brecher and Alejandro (1977). Khan (1980) re-examines these 
results in the presence of urban unemployment , three factors of production: 
labor，land and capital and non-competi t ive wage determination in the urban 
labor market. 
Batra and Naqvi (1987) constructed a welfare ranking of alternative 
commercia l policies is for the mobile capital Harris-Todaro economy. It is 
shown that, despite the presence of unemployment , most noninterventionist 
policies suggested by the competi t ive model of gains f r o m trade carry over 
to the mobi le capital Harris-Todaro economy. Yet in contradiction to the 
competi t ive model , it is shown that all fo rms of trade intervention are not 
detrimental to welfare. Only those that reduce the vo lume of t rade are. The 
export promotion policies so copiously fol lowed by developing countries 
are vindicated, but their import substitution policies are shown to be without 
just if icat ion. 
Chao and Yu (1990，1992) examine the short-run and long-run wel fare 
implications of an exogenous shift in the terms of trade for an economy 
plagued with substantial urban unemployment . It is shown that the wel fa re 
effects of terms of trade loss depend on its impacts on urban unemployment , 
which in turn are determined by whether the economy is distorted by a tariff 
or a quota and whether capital is completely immobi le or perfectly mobile . 
The authors ' main result is that deterioration in the te rms of t rade in the 
presence of urban unemployment may improve welfare. They also show that 
the remarkable result by Khan and Naqvi (1983) that a reduction in the 
capital rental differential a lways improves wel fare despite the fact that the 
presence of a rigid urban wage can be obtained only for the 2 x 2 
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Harris-Todaro model . In an extended Harris-Todaro f r amework 
incorporat ing a third specif ic factor, a decrease in a distort ion may not 
necessari ly be wel fare improving. 
Neary (1981) extends the intersectoral capital mobil i ty mode l o f 
Corden and Findlay (1975) by considering the dynamic side of the model . 
Corden and Findlay (1975) conf ined their analysis to compara t ive static, 
which seems to be inappropriate in analyzing the dynamic phenomena as 
rural urban migrat ion and intersectoral capital allocation. Moreover , by 
consider ing the dynamic behavior of the model , the quest ion of dynamic 
stability of long-run equil ibr ium can b e explored. Harris and Todaro (1970) 
show that the model is stable with sector-specific model but Neary shows 
that it will no longer be the case if capital is intersectorally mobile . H e 
fur ther conveys the condition that the manufac tur ing sector is relatively 
capital- intensive is a necessary bu t not suff icient condit ion fo r stability. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Traditional t rade theories emphas ize on commodi ty t rade and convey 
that t rade l iberalization can encourage growth and hence improve we l fa re 
(Dollar 1992, Edwards 1993, Sachs and Warner 1995) but some studies 
(Stoforos and Chrysos tomos 2003) ju s t demonstra te the opposite. 
Later, the idea of factor mobil i ty has been developed. It is shown that 
f r ee capital f l o w will enhance wel fa re (Murray K e m p 1962 and Ba logh and 
Streeton 1960). However , countr ies somet imes tax fore ign capital for 
revenue purpose. The introduction of capital taxes tends to cause ha rm to 
the domest ic wel fa re under perfect compet i t ion ( K e m p 1966，Casas 1985, 
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Neary 1988a and Hatzipanayotou and Michael 1993) and imperfect 
compet i t ion (Brander and Spencer 1984). However, capital taxes may 
somet imes be beneficial to the domestic welfare (Lai 2001) if the marke t 
structure is imperfectly competitive. 
Industries are always characterized by unemployment . Harris and 
Todaro (1970) introduce unemployment by developing a two-sector mode l 
in which min imum wage exists in one sector. The original fo rm of Harris 
and Todaro model does not al low capital mobility. Corden and Findlay 
(1975) relax the assumption of capital immobili ty so that the Harris and 
Todaro model can be more comparable with the reality. Under the Harr is 
and Todaro economy, capital subsidy is beneficial to the domest ic welfare 




Capital Taxation under Perfect Competition 
3.1 Introduction 
As one of the world 's trading, shipping，and financial centres. Hong Kong 
involves actively in international trade. Its free business environment has 
attracted quite a number of foreigners to establish companies or invest in 
Hong Kong. On the other hand, tourism has made up a large proportion of 
G D P of Hong Kong. So industries in Hong Kong can be characterized with 
both traded and non-traded sectors. Hong Kong is famous for its zero tariffs 
for almost all imported goods, which can be regarded as a robust measure to 
encourage imports. Although Hong Kong is under f ree trade f lows, it also 
taxes foreign capital. Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1993) examine the 
welfare effect of capital tax when there are trade policies such as tariffs, 
import quotas and voluntary export restraints, and compare it with the result 
when there is trade liberalization. In their framework, there are only traded 
goods and the market structure is characterized by perfect competition. We 
would like to do similar analysis in this chapter but the non-traded sector is 
introduced in our framework. 
We construct a general-equilibrium model to capture the properties of 
perfect competit ion in Section 3.2. Comparat ive statics analysis will be 
carried out in Section 3.3. The welfare impact of capital t ax is discussed in 
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents concluding remarks. 
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3.2 The Model 
Cons ide r a small open economy producing two goods: a t raded good (Y) 
and a non- t raded good (X). Both sectors use l a b o r , L , and capital,A：, as their 
p roduc t ion factors. The product ion funct ions of the sectors are: 
X = and Y = Y{Ly,Ky) , where L, and denote the labor 
and capital employed in sector / ， i = X J , respectively. T h e product ion 
func t ions are characterized by constant returns to scale. Commodi ty t rade is 
not subject to any t rade barr iers l ike import quotas, voluntary expor t 
restraints or tariffs. The price of the non-traded good to that of the t raded 
good，p，is de termined by the market-clear ing condi t ion of the non- t raded 
good (The pr ice of the t raded good is unity). All goods are a s sumed to b e 
normal . Commodi ty t rade or capital movemen t s cannot a f fec t nei ther the 
wor ld pr ices of the t raded goods nor the wor ld rate of return on capital 
because of the small country assumption. 
For the labor market , w e assume that firms can only e m p l o y domes t i c 
worker s as product ion factors. Also, w e will not consider the scenarios that 
the re is popula t ion growth or that labor work with variable work ing hours or 
that labor fo rce part icipation is endogenous,^ so that the supply of labor are 
f ixed. Tha t m e a n s L = L, where L is the labour fo rce of the domest ic 
country. Full employmen t is assured by a l lowing w a g e to b e f lexible. Labor 
receive wage , w，which is equal to the value of marginal product of labor. 
T h e supply of capital totally depends on fore ign direct investment，A： • ， 
w h i c h is greater than zero, i.e.K = K \ T h e rental rate to capital wi th in 
2 There are two approaches to model endogenous labor supply. One is to keep the 
number of workers is fixed, but work hours are flexible while the second approach is work 
hours are fixed but labor force participation is endogenous. 
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domestic country is equal to r where r = + Note that T and r* 
are the capital tax rate and the world rental rate respectively. Both factors 
are perfectly mobile between sectors, so that LJ^ +Ly 二 L and 
K y + K y = K* . Due to the perfect mobility of factors, their returns are 
equalized in the two sectors. 
Consider the demand side of the economy. A representative consumer 
wishes to maximize utility, subject to a budget constraint, 
pDx + Dy = / , where D, is the consumption demand for good i . The 
solution to this optimizing problem yields the indirect utility function, 
V { p j ) , where p is the relative price of good X (the price of the traded 
good equals unity) and I denotes income. 
There are several ways to specify the utility function. For analytical 
tractability, we follow Konishi, et al (1990) and Chao and Yu (1994) by 
choosing a quasi-linear utility function; that i s ， U { D , , D y ) = u ( D , ) + D y . 
This gives rise to the demand function for good X : p = p (Dx )，where 
) = du{Px ) / dDx with p {D^ ) < 0 . The demand function for good X 
depends only on the price of the good so that we can abstract from the 
income effect. This is a simplifying property of the quasi-linear utility 
function. In equilibrium, the market supply of the non-traded good must 
meet the market demand for the non-traded good, that is, X = ， 
rendering: p = p{x). This yields the inverse demand function of good X， 
with p\x)<0 . Note that because good X is non-traded, its price is 
endogenously determined. 
Since both traded and non-traded sectors exhibit constant returns to 
scale and the market is perfectly competitive, their unit costs should be 
17 
equal to their unit prices. We have the following equations: 
(1) 
C'{w,r) = \ (2) 
where C ) is the unit cost function for sector j , w and r = + are 
wage and rental rate respectively. 
For conducting a comparative-static analysis in the general-equilibrium 
setting, we need to turn to the factor markets. According to Shephard's 
lemma, the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to factor 
prices yield factor demands; for example, L^ =C;f (w,r)X. Using this 
approach, full employment of workers and the distribution of capital can be 
expressed by 
C ^ { w , r ) X + Cl{w,r)Y = L (3) 
+ = r (4) 
where Ci /dw and C / Idr are unit labor and capital 
requirements for sector j respectively. 
To identify the various effects of capital tax, it is useful to find the cost 
effect on outputs. We begin with the relation between wage and the capital 
tax. Let “八” be the percentage change of the variable. Differentiating 
equation (2), we get 
: / “ - � � < 0 (5) 
where < 9灯= C j r / C ^ and Oj^ y ^ C l w I C ^ are the cost shares of capital 
and labor for the traded sector respectively. Obviously, to maintain zero 
profit in the traded sector, the changes of W and T must be opposite. 
Differentiating equation (1) and using equation (5) to f ind a relation 
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between T and X : 
e ^ y X = e9T (6) 
where e - -p! p'X is the price elasticity of demand for the non-traded 
good. Note that <9 = (9以<9灯-Oly^kx^ where is the cost 
share of capital for sector X and is cost share of labor for 
sector X. 
To get an interpretation between outputs and foreign capital inflows, 
we differentiate the equilibrium conditions for capital and labor markets in 
equations (3) and (4) and use equation (5) to yield 
A A 
^LX ^ LY 0LY ^ LY ^ = FLY ^LY ^ KY 
+ 义LY (^KT ^ LX — ^LY ^ KX ^ X (7) 
入KXSLY 义 A y- ^LY = [OKY^Kr^LY ( ^ r -1) 
+ ^KX i^KY 01X0 X - ^LY 0KX W 
where cTj = I C l C ^ is the elasticity of factor substitution for sector 
j ’ = CijIK* and A" = C i j / L are the capital and labor shares of 
sector j respectively. It can be seen from equation (7) that if ay > (< ) l 
and (7^ > {<) ^KY^Lx ^ ^LY^Kx ‘ an increase in capital tax will be harmful 
(beneficial) to the outputs of the traded and non-traded sector. However, 
different scenario is shown in equation (8). A rise in capital tax increases 
(decreases) the outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors but decreases 
(increases) foreign capital if C7y > (<) 1 and a ^ > (<) Oj^ yOf^ / ^ky^lx ‘ 
Hence, the output and resource allocational effects of an exogenous capital 
tax are governed by the elasticities of factor substitution for both sectors. 
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3.3 Comparative Static Analysis 
H a v i n g set up equat ions for the model in Section 3.2，we are ready to do 
compara t ive static exercises to illustrate the relat ionships be tween the 
capital tax and other variables. 
Af t e r the imposi t ion of the capital tax, the cost of us ing capital wil l 
b e c o m e higher s ince producers have to pay r = + r ) instead of r*. 
This may damper the inf lows of foreign capital. A s a result , it is crucial t o 
invest igate the e f fec t of an increase in the capital tax on the fore ign capital . 
Solv ing equat ions (6) to (8)，we g e t � 
AT./r = OIy 巧KT没Lr义KY义Lr 一 0 + 义i^r义/a {^X^KY^lx 一 ^LY^KX ) 
—义灯义LY i^ KY ^ LX - L^Y ^^ 似]/ A (9) 
w h e r e A = - O l y ^ i r < 0 and X =义灯 A辽 一 ^ l y ^ k x . 
In equat ion (9)，0 and A can be regarded as the factor intensity in 
va lue and physical sense for sector X. The concept of fac tor intensity w a s 
fo rmal ized by Samuelson (1953-54) and popular ized by Jones (1965) .When 
ei ther 9 or A is posi t ive (negative), it m e a n s that sector X and Y are 
labor (capital) intensive and capital ( labor) intensive r e spec t ive ly . A s a 
result , the signs o f 0 and ^ are a lways the same, implying that the four th 
t e rm of the numera tor of equat ion (9) is positive. 
F r o m the stability condit ions, ^ w e obta in AY >1 ， 
^LY^KX^X -^KY^uc > ^ and (Jx^Lx^KY -^LY^KX > 0. As E rcsult , t he 
numera to r of the express ion in equat ion (9) is greater than zero. N o t e that 
A A 
K*It < 0 because A < 0 . Then the fo l lowing proposi t ion fo l lows: 
3 See Appendix I. 
4 See Appendix II. 
‘ S e e Appendix HI. 
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Proposition 3.1 Under the stable economy with perfect competition, the 
inflow of foreign capital is reduced as a result of a rise in the capital tax 
rate. 
The fact that inflow of foreign capital is hampered after the imposition 
of capital tax should cause little surprise since after an increase in the capital 
tax, the cost of capital in domestic country increases. As a result, producers 
will decrease the use of foreign capital inflows as factors of production. This 
result is different from that of Hatzipanayotou and Michael 's paper (1993) 
in which it is concluded that trade liberalization will cause capital outflow 
(inflow) if the imported good is capital (labor) intensive but here, the effect 
of an increase in the capital tax on foreign capital inflows is independent of 
factor intensity. However, our result is similar to that of Casas (1985)，who 
shows that a rise in capital tax discourages inflows of foreign capital. 
After ascertaining the effect of an increase in the capital tax on the 
inflows of foreign capital, we move to investigate the output effect. Solving 
equations (6) to (8)’ we get 
二-selY�Y默 (10) 
f / r = - G l y ( 1 -<7 , )+ { e ^ e ^ - 化 厂 没 灯 冲 A ( i i ) 
As mentioned before, sector X and Y are labor (capital) intensive and capital 
(labor) intensive respectively if G is greater (smaller) than zero. Since the 
denominator in equation (10) is always negative, we can argue that 
XIT < (> ) 0 if sector X is capital (labor) intensive. We can ascertain the 
output effect for the traded sector f rom equation (11). The stability 
conditions show that > 1， 0 can be positive or negative and 
^LY^Kx^x > 0. So, thc fiFst two te ims in the numerator in equation 
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(11) should be smaller than zero. If 没 > 0’ i.e. sector X is labor intensive, 
八 A 
then YIt < 0 . However, if 6 <0，i.e. sector X is capital intensive, the third 
term in the numerator in equation (11) is positive. But if the factor intensity 
A A 
effect is large enough, then 7 / r > 0 . Thus, we state Proposition 2 and 
Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3.2 If the non-traded sector is capital (labor) intensive, the 
output of the non-traded good will decrease (increase) as the capital tax 
rate increases, when the market structure is characterized by perfect 
competition. 
Proposition 3.3 In a world of perfect competition, the output of the 
non-traded sector will decrease with capital tax if the traded sector is 
capital intensive. Although the output effect of the traded sector is 
ambiguous when it is labor intensive, we can ascertain that the output of 
this sector will increase when the factor intensity effect is sufficiently large. 
From Propositions 2 and 3, we can see that the output effects of both sectors 
are consistent with the Rybczynski Theorem (Rybczynski 1955) which says 
that the production of a good will decrease (increase) if the supply of the 
factor which is used intensively in its production decreases (increases). We 
see that outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors increase (decrease) 
with inflows of foreign capital if they are capital (labor) intensive. 
The output effects derived from equations (10) and (11) are similar to 
those from Hatzipanayotou and Michael 's paper (1993). They show that the 
output effect of the higher capital tax depends on the factor intensity of the 
imported good. If the imported good is capital intensive, an increase in the 
capital tax reduces the domestic use of capital and hence the production of 
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the capital intensive imported good. In our f ramework , w e derived that the 
product ion of the traded and non-traded sectors will be affected adversely if 
they are capital intensive. Outputs of the t raded and non-traded sectors will 
increase if the traded and non-traded are labor intensive and the factor 
intensity ef fec t is significant. 
3.4 Welfare Analysis 
After ascertaining the effects of an increase in the capital t ax on the capital 
in f lows and the supply of the t raded and non-traded goods in Section 3.3, 
w e are ready to shed some light on domest ic welfare. Neary (1993) has 
analyzed the wel fa re implications of tax on internationally mobi le capital in 
the presence of tariffs. H e shows that non-interference wi th all international 
t ransact ions is the first best policy. Brecher and Diaz Alegjandro (1977) 
show that w h e n imports are subject to tariffs, an introduction of fore ign 
capital inf lows intensifies the tariff distortion and hence reduces wel fa re 
effect . Hence , t rade liberalization tends to be a first best policy. Here , w e 
will explore whether the result that the imposi t ion of the capital tax will 
r educe wel fa re is true. To begin with, w e specify the income identity of 
domes t ic residents in equation (12): 
I = wL + rr*K* (12) 
T h e first part of equation (12) denotes the wage to the domest ic labor. Since 
there are L labor and the wage rate is w，total income contr ibut ing to 
labor force is w L . The second part of the equat ion implies that the tax 
revenue collected by the h o m e country is remit ted to domest ic residents as a 
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lump sum.6 
T h e indirect utility func t ion of the domest ic residents is represented as 
V { p j ) , as stated at the beginning of this chapter. Different ia t ing the 
indirect utility func t ion , w e have 
dVIVj =(v^/vj)p'dx + dl (13) 
w h e r e Vp=dV/dp. No te that V! =dV/dI is unity under quasi- l inear 
preference . Equa t ion (13) can b e writ ten as 
dV = -Xp'dX + dl'^ (14) 
Dif fe ren t ia t ing equat ion (12) to get an identity of change in income:^ 
dI = Xp�dX + r'zdfC (15) 
Subst i tut ing equat ion (15) into equat ion (14)，we obtain 
dV = r*iaiK* (16) 
F r o m equat ion (16), w e can see that the change in the capital t ax m a k e s 
domes t i c wel fa re and foreign capital in f lows vary in the same direction. T h e 
coef f ic ien t of dK* is the capital tax revenue collected for a unit of fore ign 
capital inflow. Hatz ipanayotou and Michae l (1993) show that the change in 
domes t i c we l fa re depends on change in capital t ax revenue. This result is 
ver i f ied here. It is observed that if dK* / dr < (>) 0，welfare wil l be a f fec ted 
adverse ly (benef ic ia l ly) s ince the tax revenue col lected will b e reduced 
( increased) . F rom equa t ion (9)，we have dK* I dr < 0 . Thus , an increase in 
capital t ax is welfare- reducing. As a result . Proposi t ion 4 is implied: 
Proposition 3.4 An increase in capital tax is welfare-reducing if the 
6 We follow Hatzipanayotou and Michael's setting (1993) that capital tax collected will 
be remitted to domestic residents to become part of the nation income. 
7 By Roy's identity, V^ IVj - -D^ . For the non-traded good, D^ = X . 
8 The differential of equation (1)，Cldw + C^r^dT = 0，is used to obtain equation 
(15). 
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market structure is characterized by perfect competition. 
Proposition 4 is in contrast with the result suggested by Bhagwati (1973) 
who says that taxation of foreign capital inflows will enhance welfare under 
perfect competition. The welfare effect we derived is similar to that f rom 
Hatzipanayotou and Michael 's paper (1993) in which it is concluded that the 
first best solution to domestic welfare when there are foreign capital inflows 
is zero capital tax. Brecher and Alejandro (1977) demonstrate that the 
capital inflow reduces domestic welfare provided that the tariff-imposing 
nation did not levy a tax on the returns of foreign capital and the country 
remained incompletely specialized in production. Weichenrieder and 
Dehej ia (2001) show that in the presence of capital taxation, economy may 
benefi t f rom attracting taxable capital from the rest of the world. 
There are other studies saying that whether trade liberalization will 
improve welfare in the presence of the capital tax depends on the initial 
amount of foreign capital as well as the rate of the capital tax on foreign 
capital. Yabuuchi (1982) and Casas (1985) have this result. The former 
derives that if there are initially foreign capital inflows, trade liberalization 
can improve welfare if and only if the capital tax is bounded. However if 
there are no foreign capital inflows initially, the imposition of tariff may be 
welfare-increasing if capital tax is large. Casas (1985) shows that a 
necessary condition for trade liberalization to be welfare-increasing in a 
small country is foreign capital being taxed or subsidized at a capital tax rate 
that maximizes the real income for the given tariff rate. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter introduces a general equilibrium model of a small open 
economy, which produces two goods by using two factors of production, 
labor and foreign capital. Capital is subject to a tax and depends entirely on 
the foreign capital inflows while the supply of labor are fixed. All 
production activities are under perfect competition. The aim of this chapter 
is to investigate within this framework the effects of an exogenous capital 
tax on foreign capital inflows, outputs and welfare of domestic residents. 
An increase in capital tax decreases the foreign capital inflows, which 
reduces the supply of the traded and non-traded goods if both sectors are 
capital-intensive and increase their outputs if they are labor intensive and 
the factor intensity effect is large. This result is consistent with the 
Rybczynski Theorem (Rybczynski 1955) which says that the production of a 
good will decrease (increase) if the supply of the factor which is used 
intensively in the production decreases (increases). 
Moreover, an increase in the capital tax is welfare-reducing. It is not 
surprised to get this result since it is well-known that welfare of a country 
can be maximized only when it is under f ree trade and perfect capital 




Capital Taxation under Imperfect Competition 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we have examined that how an increase in capital tax affects 
domest ic welfare, outputs and foreign capital inflows when the market is 
perfectly competit ive. We obtain the result that the inflow of foreign capital 
is welfare-reducing for an increase in capital tax. The assumption that both 
sectors are under perfect competit ion seems to be unrealistic for the reason 
that industries can seldom fulfil l this criterion. So, imperfect competit ion is 
introduced in this chapter. 
Brander (1981) and Harris (1985) among others claims that traditional 
t rade theories are no longer valid if the market structure is not perfectly 
competit ive. There is voluminous literature about the imperfectly 
competi t ive market structure. Krueger (1984) in her survey points out that 
though market imperfect ion exists in developed nations, the imperfection is 
far more serious in developing country. Helpman (1984) investigates the 
effects of protectionist policies in an economy characterized by increasing 
returns to scale. Guidotti (1991) and Lai (2001) investigate the welfare 
effect when industries are under the technology of increasing returns to 
scale. In reality, the non-traded sector such as tourism is of ten characterized 
by imperfect competi t ion while perfect competi t ion prevails in the traded 
sector. In this chapter, we assume that the non-traded sector is operated by a 
monopolist . However , the traded sector remains to be under perfect 
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competition. 
We set up a general-equilibrium model in which the non-traded sector 
is under imperfect competition in Section 4.2. Comparative static analysis is 
carried out in Section 4.3. The welfare impact of the capital tax is discussed 
in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents concluding remarks. 
4.2 The Model 
Consider a small open economy consisting of two sectors: sector Y produces 
a traded good and sector X，which is operated by a monopolist, produces a 
non-traded good. Labor and capital are the production factors for both 
sectors. Commodity trade is free, i.e. imported or exported goods are not 
subject to taxes. The price of the non-traded good to that of the traded good, 
p，is determined by the monopolist (The price of the traded good is unity). 
All goods are assumed to be normal. Commodity trade or capital 
movements exert no effect on world prices of traded goods and the world 
rate of return to capital. Furthermore, the production of good Y is under 
constant returns to scale, whereas good X is produced under the technology 
of increasing returns to scale. 
For the factor market, the supply of labor are L which is f ixed while 
that of capital, K depends wholly on foreign direct investment, K*. 
Foreign capital is subject to a tax rate of r and hence the cost of capital 
within domestic country is r = " ( 1 +r)，where r* is the world interest rate. 
Workers receive a wage of w • The production functions for sectors X and 
Y are X = 入)and Y = Y{Ly,Ky) , where L, and K, are the 
labor and capital for sector i respectively. 
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A s s u m e for simplicity that consumer tastes can be represented by a 
quasi l inear utility funct ion , where D,. is the 
consumpt ion demand for good i , This gives rise to the demand funct ion 
fo r good X: p = p{Dx) , where p{Dx)= du{Dx)ldD^ . No te that 
and the quasi- l inear specif icat ion of demand rules out the 
i ncome effect . A representat ive consumer aims at maximiz ing the 
a fo remen t ioned utility funct ion , subject to a budget constraint. The solution 
to th is op t imiz ing p rob lem yields the indirect utility funct ion, V { p j ) , 
w h e r e p is the relative price of good X (the price of t raded good Y equals 
uni ty) and I denotes income. Since X is the non-trade good, the marke t 
supply of X m u s t m e e t its marke t demand in equil ibrium, that is,X = D^. 
A s a result , w e obtain that p = p{x). This yields the inverse demand 
func t ion o f good X ， w i t h / ? ' ( x ) < 0 . Pr ice of good X is endogenous ly 
de te rmined accord ing to this inverse demand funct ion since it is a 
non- t raded good. 
S ince sector Y exhibi ts constant returns to scale, and the marke t is 
perfec t ly compet i t ive , its unit cost is equal to its price. Equat ion (1) shows 
this condi t ion: 
C � ) = 1 � 
w h e r e C^ is the unit cost func t ion for the t raded sector and w and r a re 
the w a g e ra te of workers and cost of capital respectively. 
To faci l i tate our analysis, w e should f ind the relat ion be tween wage and 
the capital tax. Let “ A ” be the percentage change o f the variable. 
Di f fe ren t ia t ing equa t ion (1), w e get 
9 We follow the specification of Konishi’ et al (1990) and Chao and Yu (1994). 
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；/“-没灯/ 〜 < 0 (2) 
w h e r e < 9 灯 = C l r / C ^ and O^y = C l w / C ^ are cost shares of capital and 
labor fo r the t raded sector respectively. The changes of w and r should 
b e oppos i te so that zero profi t condit ion can be mainta ined in the t raded 
sector. 
Fo l lowing C h a o and Yu (1997) on the cost ftmction under imperfec t 
compet i t ion , w e def ine the total cost of the non-traded sector, C{w, r,X),as 
m{w,r)X + F(w,r), where m Q and f Q represent marginal cost and 
quas i - f ixed cost respectively. The exis tence of the quasi-f ixed cost operates 
increas ing re turns to scale for the monopolis t . For simplicity, marginal 
cost , m(.)，is a s sumed to be independent of X � � T h e aforement ioned total 
cost func t ion is used because it not only demonstra tes the features of a 
monopo l i s t but at the same t ime, s implif ies our analysis by assuming that 
the margina l cost func t ion does not depend on X. T h e p r o f i t，n , of the 
monopo l i s t in sector X is s imply equal to its total revenue minus total cost: 
n = - m(w, r)X - F(w, r ) � 
Diffe ren t ia t ing equa t ion (3) wi th respect to X and setting it to b e zero to 
m a x i m i z e the prof i t of the monopol is t , w e obtain 
p(x)+xp'(x)=m(w,r) (4) 
T h e lef t and right hand sides of equat ion (4) are the marginal revenue and 
margina l cost fo r sector X respectively. 
To f ind the relation be tween the capital tax and output of the 
non- t raded sector, w e dif ferent ia te equat ion (4) and use equat ion (2) to get 
10 The quasi-fixed cost in producing good X is also the barrier of entry. This is 
consistent with the assumption of monopoly in the non-traded sector. 
“ W e follow Konishi, et.al (1990) to adopt this simplifying specification. 
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e , y { 2 - e ) X ^ - e j s T (5) 
w h e r e e = -Xp��丨p is the inverse of the elasticity of the slope of the 
d e m a n d fo r good X，b = m/ p is the ratio of the marginal cost to the price 
o f good X，Gm = Oly^Zc -^KY^ix and e^-p!Xp is the pr ice elasticity 
of d e m a n d in sector X. No te that = wm^lm and = rmj m are 
the margina l cost shares of labor and capital for sector X respectively. It is 
impor tant to convey that e > (<) 0 w h e n the demand func t ion for the 
non- t raded good is convex (concave). ^^  We can see that the effect of an 
increase in the capital tax on the supply o f the non-traded sector depends on 
w h i c h c a n be regarded as the marginal fac tor intensity ranking in the 
va lue sense. T h e concept of the marginal fac tor intensity originates with 
Jones (1968) , and is uti l ized by Choi and Yu (1987) and Chao and Takayama 
(1990) . F r o m equat ion (5)，we c an observe that the effect of an increase in 
the capital tax on the supply of the non-traded sector depends on the 
margina l fac tor intensity. 
Our a i m is to conduc t a comparat ive-stat ic analysis in the 
genera l -equi l ibr ium setting. Hence , w e need to turn to the factor markets . 
Acco rd ing to Shephard ' s l emma , the partial derivatives of the cost func t ion 
wi th respect to fac tor prices yield factor demands . Us ing this approach, ful l 
e m p l o y m e n t o f worker s and capital in the host country can be expressed by 
mMr)X + Ci； {w^r^ = Z (6) 
+ C； ( w , r ) 7 = K* (7) 
w h e r e nij =dm/dj\ F) 二 dFldj and C] / d j , J = w,r. 
12 See Seade (1980) for a detailed discussion on the slope of the demand curve. 
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We different ia te the full employment condit ions in factor marke ts in 
equat ions (6) and (7) and use equat ion (2) to get a relat ion be tween outputs 
of the t raded and non- t raded sectors, and foreign capital inf lows; 
^ ^LY 知 ^LY 又KT 0LY K* = -[没AT 义AT ^ LY (l " T^y ) 
^^A^LYOKX-OKYOijc^^X)]^ (9) 
w h e r e ； a n d IK* are the shares of labor and 
capital used as var iable inputs in the non-traded sector respectively, 
；I" = C l Y / L and ； I 灯 = C l Y / K * are the shares of labor and capital in 
the t raded-sector respectively, 
and or ^ d C n C i C i is the elasticity of 
fac tor subst i tut ion for sector j • It can be seen from equat ion (8) that if 
CTy > ( < ) 1 and Gx > ( < ) ^ a t ^ l y ! ^ l y ^ k x，a rise in the capital t ax is 
det r imental (benef ic ia l ) to the outputs of the t raded and non-t raded sectors. 
Howeve r , w h e n the percentage change in foreign capital is involved, as 
s h o w n in equa t ion (9)，an increase in capital tax increases (decreases) and 
decreases ( increases) outputs and foreign capital respectively if cr^ > (<) 1 
and Gx > (<) Oly^kx I ^ky^uc • a result , effects of a rise in capital t ax on 
sectoral outputs and fore ign capital are dependent on the elasticities of 
fac tor subst i tut ion fo r bo th sectors. 
To get an overv iew about the ef fec ts of an increase in the capital t ax on 
ou tpu ts and fore ign capital in f lows , w e solve equat ions (5)，(8) and (9):^^ 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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？ / ？ = Oly - ( 2 一 (l-CTy) 
UIAOLYSKKOX-OKYOucW^ (10) 
(11) 
义•/ ；=略 + ( 2 - 沒 灯 没 以 B)]/A (12) 
w h e r e A = X^Xj^y + ^ur^^jo^cr^ > 0 , 
义m =义又灯-义ZT又ZC and A = -O^y^^ly (2 - e ) < 0.！斗 
A A 
F r o m equat ions (10) and (11)，we observe that the signs of 7 / r and 
A A 
XIX depend on ，which can be regarded as the marginal factor intensity 
rank ing in the va lue sense. F rom equat ion (12), it is ascertained that the sign 
A A 
of K*丨T depends on bo th and . It is noted that X^ is the 
margina l fac tor intensity ranking in the physical sense. If > (<) 0，sector 
X is said to b e capital ( labor) intensive in the va lue sense at the margin. ^ ^ 
Howeve r , if > (<) 0，sector X is labor (capital) intensive in the physical 
sense at the margin. ^^  For detai ls of the marginal fac tor intensity ranking in 
t he physica l and value senses, see Chao and Yu (2002) .This result is 
cons is tent wi th that found in Chapter 3 in wh ich bo th sectors are under 
pe r fec t compet i t ion. In Chap te r 3, w e ascertain that the output ef fec t 
d e p e n d s on the fac tor intensity rank ing in the va lue sense. 
F r o m equat ions (10) to (12), it is easy to see that the expressions are 
too compl ica ted . W e can nei ther ascertain their signs nor exert condi t ions on 
them. A s a result , w e wou ld like to m a k e a modi f ica t ion to the analysis. 
14 See Appendix IV. 
” See Appendix V. 
16 See Appendix V. 
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Instead of making the marginal and the quasi-fixed cost functions depend on 
bo th wage and cost of capital, we simply let the marginal and quasi-fixed 
cost funct ions depend only on wage and cost of capital respectively. As a 
result, the total cost funct ion of the non-traded sector is: m(w)X + 
The first and second terms of the modif ied total cost funct ion capture the 
variable and f ixed costs of production of the non-traded good respectively. 
So, w e can convey that after the modificat ion of the total cost function，the 
monopol is t uses labor as the only variable factor and capital as the only 
f ixed factor. For sector X, the profit made by the monopolist is: 
n = P{X)X — m{w)X - F[r) (13) 
Different ia t ing equation (13) with respect to X and letting it to be zero, we 
acquire the condit ion of profi t maximizat ion of the monopolist: 
P{X)+XP'{X)=m{w) (14) 
Equat ion (14) states the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost, 
which is the profit maximizat ion condition for the non-traded sector. As for 
sector Y，which is perfectly competi t ive, firms are price takers. So，equation 
(2), which shows that the wage and capital tax move in different directions, 
is still applicable here. 
Af te r setting up equat ions for the goods market , we turn to the factor 
markets . According to Shepard ' s lemma, the partial derivatives of the cost 
func t ion with respect to factor prices yield factor demands; for example, 
Lx - m^{yv)X. Us ing this approach，full employment of workers and the 
distr ibution of capital can be expressed by the fol lowing two equations: 
+ Cl{w,r)Y (15) 
F X r V c l { w , r ) Y = r (16) 
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where m^ =dm/dw, (：：?』二 dC” dj and F^^dFldr, j = w,r. 
It is assumed that although the monopolistic firm in sector X has power 
over output prices, the firm is nonetheless a price taker in the competitive 
labor and capital markets. Note that flexibility in factor prices ensures full 
employment in the economy. 
We can obtain the impact of cost on the output of the non-traded sector 
by differentiating equation (14) and using equation (2): 
where e : - X p � � l p is the inverse of the elasticity of the slope of the 
demand for good X and f 二 - p � / 却 ⑴ is the price elasticity of 
demand for sector X. From this equation, we can see that capital tax affects 
the output of the non-traded good adversely (beneficially) if 2 <(>)E. By 
comparing equation (17) with equation (5), we can find that left hand sides 
A 
of both equations are the same. However, the coefficient of r in equation 
(5) consists of which can be regarded as the marginal factor intensity 
ranking in the value sense, while that in equation (17) depends only on the 
cost shares of capital and labor for the traded sector and the cost share of 
labor for the non-traded sector. 
To ascertain the relation between change in output of the traded sector 
and that of the non-traded sector, we differentiate full employment condition 
in the labor market in equation (15) and use equation (2): 
GlAuC 义 + ^LY^LY y = [^UC + ^LY^LY _ (18) 
From equation (18), it is conveyed that if the elasticity of factor substitution 
for the traded sector is smaller than unity, then an increase in capital tax has 
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beneficial effects on the outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors. 
Otherwise, the output effects are ambiguous. 
We can obtain how changes in traded good and foreign capital inflows 
interact by differentiating equation (16) and using equation (2): 
义灯 (19) 
It is observed that the effects of an increase in capital tax exerts negative and 
positive effects on the supply of the traded good and inflows of foreign 
capital respectively if the elasticity of factor substitution for the traded 
sector is smaller than unity. If not, the effects of the capital tax on them are 
undetermined. 
Equations (17) to (19) consist of three unknowns, X , Y andK\ 
along with the policy of the capital tax. We examine the various effects 
resulting f rom the change in r in the next section. 
4.3 Comparative Static Analysis 
For many economies, foreign direct investment is beneficial to domestic 
residents. However, countries may sometimes tax foreign capital for the tax 
revenue purpose. This may hamper inflows of foreign capital and then affect 
adversely the outputs of sectors. We will investigate whether it is true or not. 
Firstly, we obtain the effect of an increase in the capital tax on the foreign 
capital inflows by solving equations (17) to (19):^^ 
A 八 
K*IT = -Gly {[(2 -e)-
+ Oly (2 - e)Jl,y (2没灯 A灯 ov + )}/ A (20) 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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where A = -Oiy^Xj^^ (2 - e) < 0 . The stability conditions confirm that 
A A 
2 � e . i 8 From equation (20)，it is easy to see that if 2-e<E, K*/T is 
A A 
negative. Otherwise, the sign of K*I r is uncertain. 
We then explore the effect of an increase in the capital tax on output of 
the non-traded sector from equation (17): 
XI T^ -Aj^y Of^ A>0 (21) 
From equation (21), we observe that an increase in the capital tax will 
always increase the production of sector X. This is because marginal cost 
depends only on wage which decreases for a higher capital tax. As a result, 
the production of X increases. The following proposition is implied: 
Proposition 4.1 The imposition of the capital tax increases the production 
of the non-traded good when this sector is imperfectly competitive. 
The output effect shown in Proposition 1 is different f rom that of Chapter 3 
which said that outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors depend on the 
factor intensity of sectors. However, it is no longer the case under imperfect 
competition. By comparing the profit maximization conditions in equation 
(14) and in equation (1) of Chapter 3, we find that X depends only on wage 
under imperfect competition but it relies on wage and rental rate when the 
market structure is perfectly competitive. 
Next, we solve equations (17) to (19) to get the output effect of the 
traded sector as in equation (22): 
7 / r = Oj^y^I^y(2-e)c7yOj^A^y 一/I辽(9灯(2-e — £)]/A (22) 
It is conveyed f rom the stability conditions that 1-e is positive. From 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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A A 
equation (22), we can ascertain that 7 / r is negative if 2-e<e. However, 
A A 
the sign of Y! r is uncertain if s is small. 
Concerning the effect of an increase in capital tax on the foreign capital 
inflows and output in sector Y, we explore equations (20) and (22) and have 
two findings: 
( i ) If the price elasticity for good X is small, the first term in the 
numerator of equation (20) is negative while the second term is positive. As 
八 A 
a result, the sign of ATVr cannot be determined. On the other hand, the 
first term of the numerator in equation (22) is positive while the second term 
A A 
is negative. As a result, the sign of Yh is uncertain. 
( i i ) If the price elasticity for good X is large，both terms in the numerator of 
A A 
equation (20) are positive. Hence, K*lt<0. Also, both terms of the 
A A 
numerator in equation (22) are positive. As a result, 7 / r < 0 . 
Only the conclusion in case (ii) is reasonable since the monopolist will 
operate only on the elastic region of the demand curve where marginal 
revenue for the monopolist is greater than ze ro ] ) The following proposition 
is implied: 
Proposition 4.2 An increase in the capital tax will reduce the inflow of 
foreign capital and discourage the production of the traded sector when the 
non-traded sector is characterized by imperfect competition. 
From Proposition 2, capital tax hampers the inflows of foreign capital. 
We also ascertained in Chapter 3 that foreign capital is discouraged with the 
existence of capital tax. The introduction of imperfect competition cannot 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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affect the interaction from capital tax to foreign capital. On the other hand, 
output in the traded sector decreases for an increase in capital tax when the 
non-traded sector is characterized by imperfect competition, but that of 
Chapter 3 depends on the factor intensity of the traded and non-traded 
sectors. Hence, the existence of imperfect competition makes the output 
effect for the traded sector become more certain. 
It is observed from equation (21) that the output effect of the 
non-traded sector does not depend on factor intensity of each sector. We can 
explain this by using equations (4) and (14). Both equations show the profit 
maximizat ion condition for the monopolist. The left hand sides of both 
equations are the same and can be regarded as a function of X . The 
marginal cost funct ion in equation (4) depends on both wage, w , and rental 
r a t e , r , while that in equation (14) depends only on wage, w . Af ter an 
increase in capital tax, w decreases while r increases and hence whether 
the marginal cost function in equation (4) decreases or increases for an 
/ 
increase in capital tax cannot be determined. It depends on relative values of 
w and r , i.e. the ratio of wage to rental. The ratio of wage to rental rate 
then determines the ratio of capital to labor used in the sector X. So, we can 
say that X in equation (4) depends on the factor intensity of sectors. 
However , the marginal cost funct ion in equation (14) depends only on wage. 
W h e n there is an increase in capital tax, the marginal cost funct ion in 
equat ion (14) decreases unambiguously and hence, output of the non-traded 
sector increases. 
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4.4 Welfare Analysis 
A f t e r the explora t ion of the effects of an increase in capital tax on foreign 
capital and outputs in Sect ion 4.3, w e focus on the wel fare analysis b y 
de f in ing the i ncome of the nat ive residents: 
I = w I + T r * l C + 7 r (23) 
Since nat ive residents provide labor force to product ion, the amount of wage 
paid to t h e m is part of their income. The wage to each labor are w， 
m e a n i n g that total wage is w L . Moreover , it is assumed that the capital t ax 
col lec ted by nat ive country wil l be remitted to its residents as a l ump s u m 
fashion.2o So, fo r K* uni ts of capital investment , Tr*K* will be paid to 
nat ive residents. T h e monopol is t earns profits , wh ich is a part of the nat ional 
income. 
T h e indirect utility, V，can be expressed as fol lows: 
K = F ( p , / ) (24) 
w h e r e p is the relative pr ice of the non-traded to t raded goods and I 
denotes the total income of domest ic residents. Totally different iat ing 
equa t ion (24) and using R o y ' s identity yield the change in national wel fa re 
as 
dVIV\=-Xp�dX + dI (25) 
w h e r e Vj =dV I dl is unity under quasi- l inear preference. N o t e that the 
change in nat ional income, dl can b e obtained by different ia t ing equat ions 
(23) as 
20 We follow the specification of Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1993) that capital tax 
revenue is remitted to domestic residents as part of their income. 
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dl = r'rdK* + m)dX ^^  (26) 
Subst i tu t ing equa t ion (26) into equat ion (25) yields 
cIV = r*uIK* +{p-m)dX (27) 
Equa t ion (27) can then b e expressed as fo l lows to capture the effect of an 
increase in capital tax on domest ic welfare: 
ciV/dT = r*TdK*/dT + {p-m)dX / dr (28) 
T h e first t e rm on the right-hand side o f equat ion (28) reflects h o w the 
capital tax af fec ts nat ive residents ' wel fare through foreign capital inf lows. 
This te rm exists in Hatz ipanayotou and Michael (1993) under perfect 
compet i t ion . N o t e that dK* as conveyed in equation (20). The 
e f fec t of an increase in the capital tax on foreign capital br ings a detr imental 
e f f ec t to domes t ic welfare . It is because the decrease in fore ign capital 
lowers the amoun t of capital tax. We call this as the capital tax effect . 
T h e second te rm of the wel fa re expression in equation (28) expresses 
the change in the nat ive res idents ' welfare due to the monopoly distort ion in 
the non- t raded sector. In the presence of monopoly, the pr ice charged by the 
f i r m exceeds marginal cost , i.e. p>m. The greater the monopoly power , 
the larger the extent the wel fa re will be affected. This term is also shown in 
the equa t ion of the change in utility def ined by Chao and Yu (1994) w h o 
invest igate we l fa re e f fec t in an economy with imper fec t compet i t ion and 
fo re ign capital inf lows. We call this as the monopo ly distort ion effect , wh ich 
can a lso b e regarded as the scale effect . If an increase in capital tax lowers 
the product ion o f X’ then we l fa re will decrease and vice versa. This is 
because the increase in the product ion of X will decrease the average f ixed 
21 The differential of equation (1)，Cldw+ C l r d T = is used to obtain equation 
(26). 
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cost of X and hence increase the profit of the monopolist. 
From equations (20) and (21)，we obtain dK*ldT<0 and 
dXldT>0. So whether capital tax is welfare decreasing or increasing 
depends on the offsetting effects between the capital tax effect and the 
monopoly distortion effect. Note that the second term of equation (28) is 
always positive even if r varies. However, the first term of equation (28) 
changes f rom positive to negative when r starts to increase from negative 
to positive. So, it is observed that dV I dv increases and then decreases 
when r increases. This means that an optimal rate of the capital tax which 
maximizes the welfare exists. We utilize the first order condition to find the 
optimal rate of the capital tax by substituting equations (20) and (21) into 
equation (28) and setting it to be zero: 
r � =一 [(/? - m)丨,tldX / dKy > 0 (28) 
= - i p - e ^ e / { { l - e ) - s ^ l ^ ^ ； + H } 
where H = " ^ K r + ^kx^kx )> 0 and r^ i s the optimal 
capital tax. Since the optimal value of r"" is positive, we convey that the 
capital tax should be imposed so as to maximize welfare of the native 
residents. The following proposition is immediate: 
Proposition 4.3 A positive capital tax given by equation (28) should be 
imposed so as to maximize welfare of domestic residents for an economy 
under imperfect competition. 
We can explain the result by using Figure 4.1. When the capital tax is 
small (the portion OA), using capital as a factor of production is not so 
A A 八 A 
expensive. That means ATVr is not so negative. Thus, the positive XIr 
42 
A A 
dominates the negative K*IT and welfare rises. However, when the capital 
tax increases to a certain extent (the portion AB), the level of r is so large 
A A A A 
that the negative K*IT outweighs the p o s i t i v e X / r . As a result, welfare 
starts to decrease. Note that welfare is maximized at point R 
It will be valuable to compare the deviations between the welfare effect 
under perfect and imperfect competition. When the economy is under 
perfect competit ion, an imposition of capital tax is welfare-decreasing, as 
shown in Chapter 3. However, the distortion effect on welfare exerted by 
imperfect competi t ion outweighs the negative capital tax effect. Jones (1967) 
investigates the welfare effect on capital tax under a two-country, 
two-commodi ty model of trade under perfect competition and trade 
liberalization. He conveys that subsides should be given to capital exports if 
the foreign country is completely specialized. On the other hand, when the 
product ion is incomplete specialized, the optimal tax rate is positive if and 
only if there are tariffs (subsidies) and the exportables are capital (labor) 
intensive. That means both subsidies and capital taxes can bring favorable 
effect to domest ic welfare, depending on the extent of specialization of 
production. However , when there is a distortion in the market structure, 
capital tax should exist to maximize domestic welfare. 
The result in equation (28) has verified the idea of Lai (2001). Lai 
(2001) explores the price and welfare effects of import liberalization in the 
presence of capital taxes when the imported sector is under external 
increasing returns to scale. Import liberalization affects welfare through 
changes in revenue from import restrictions and revenue from taxes on 
foreign capital. The former causes a welfare gain while the latter leads to a 
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welfare loss. O n the other hand, the presence of increasing returns to scale 
causes a wel fa re loss due to the scale effect. From equation (28), it can be 
seen that the welfare effect depends on the change in revenue from the 
capital tax and the monopoly power. 
However , our result in equation (28) is different from that of Guidotti 
(1991), who investigates the welfare effect when industries are characterized 
by increasing returns to scale. He shows that a foreign capital subsidy can 
be beneficial to domest ic welfare. Moreover, Kenneth (2002) shows that the 
presence of imperfect competition strengthens the case against 
capi tal- income taxation. Our conclusion is that under trade liberalization， 
foreign capital tax should be imposed to maximize the domestic welfare. 
The aforement ioned studies convey that capital taxes affect welfare 
beneficial ly or adversely unconditionally. Lin and Zhang (1998) ment ioned 
that the wel fare effect of capital taxation depends on the allocation of the tax 
revenue as well as the tax system. If tax revenues are used to f inance debt or 
government spending, an increase in capital taxation will reduce the welfare. 
If t ax revenues are remitted to domestic residents, capital taxation increases 
welfare . 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have considered a model that the non-traded sector is 
characterized by a monopolist . Using a simplif ied assumption that marginal 
and f ixed costs depend only on wage and rental rate respectively, we 
conclude that a rise in the capital tax reduces foreign capital inf lows but 
raises the output of the non-traded sector. 
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Due to the increase in the output of the non-traded sector, factors of 
production are withdrawn from the traded sector. The withdrawal of factors 
of production f rom the traded sector, together with the decrease in inflows 
of foreign capital, will unavoidably decrease the output from the traded 
sector. 
Finally, we can see that capital tax can be both welfare-increasing and 
welfare-decreasing, depending on the capital tax effect and the monopoly 
distortion effect. The capital tax effect tends to hamper domestic welfare by 
affect ing the capital tax revenue adversely while the monopoly distortion 
effect is beneficial to the domestic welfare. When capital tax is small, the 
positive monopoly distortion effect outweighs the negative capital tax effect 
but the reverse happens when capital tax becomes large. As a result, policy 
makers should impose an optimal rate to maximize welfare. 
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Capital Taxation and Unemployment under Perfect 
Competition 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 3 and 4，we explore the effects of capital taxation on welfare , 
fore ign capital in f lows and sectoral outputs under both perfect and imperfect 
competi t ion. Full employment can be attained within those chapters since 
wage is f lexible. However , unemployment exists in reality. Hence , 
unemploymen t is introduced in this chapter. 
We int roduce unemployment by assuming that a rigid min imum wage 
is prevalent in one sector whi le f lexible wage is al lowed in another one. This 
idea was first developed by Harris and Todaro (1970). It differs from the 
original s tandard rigid-wage models of t rade theory (for example, Bhagwat i 
(1968) , Johnson (1965), Lefeber (1971)，Brencher (1971)) in which 
unemploymen t is prevalent in all sectors. 
The Harr is and Todaro (1970) claim that the second-best wage subsidy 
m a y not b e accompl ished by ful l employment . No t only Harris and Todaro 
(1970) , but also Bhagwat i and Srinivasan (1974) and Basu (1980) have 
pointed out this problem. This problem can b e solved by subsidizing bo th 
sectors. N o t e that subsidy will be f inanced by lump-sum taxes on the 
i n c o m e of the domest ic factor-owners. This means that countries combat 
unemploymen t at a cost of decreasing domest ic income. 
Capital mobil i ty be tween sectors and countries does not exist in the 
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original fo rm of Harr is and Todaro model (1970) until Corden and Findlay 
(1975) introduce intersectoral capital mobility and investigate the policies to 
comba t unemployment . Later, Gupta (1995) extends the Harris and Todaro 
mode l by consider ing opt imal policy to alleviate sectoral unemployment . H e 
shows that if an increase in wage subsidy to the urban sector is f inanced by 
taxes on foreign-capital income, the supply of foreign capital is encouraged. 
In this chapter, w e use an analytical framework of unemployment and 
taxed foreign capital to address the effects of capital taxation on outputs, 
domes t ic wel fa re and unemployment . The analytical model is introduced in 
Sect ion 5.2 whi le comparat ive static exercises will be carried out in Section 
5.3. Finally, the policy implications on welfare and concluding remarks will 
b e presented in Section 5.5 and Section 5.6 respectively. 
5.2 The Model 
We consider a small , open economy developed by Harris and Todaro (1970)， 
in wh ich t w o goods, a non-traded good, X and a traded good, Y are 
produced. Goods in both sectors utilize labor and capital as the factors of 
product ion. T h e supply of labor are fixed and depends on the populat ion of 
domes t ic residents, L ’ whi le that of capital depends entirely on the foreign 
capital inf lows, K*. The product ion funct ions of the two sectors are: 
and Y ^ Y { L y , K y ) , where and K* denote the labor 
and capital employed by sector / ， i = X , Y , respectively. 
Workers can freely m o v e be tween the traded and non-traded sectors. 
A s s u m e the wage in the non- t raded sector, w，are set at levels higher than 
market -c lear ing wages and, hence, unemployment of labor occurs in the 
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non- t raded sector. Fol lowing Harris and Todaro (1977), it is generally 
conveyed that under labor market equil ibrium, the wage in the t raded sector, 
Wy，is equal to the expected wage in the non-traded sector, which is w 
t imes the probabi l i ty of employment in the non-traded sector: 
W/{l + A,)=Wy (1) 
w h e r e X - L^ I L ^ is the unemployment ratio in the non-traded sector, and 
1/(1 +义） i s the probabil i ty of gett ing j o b s in the non-traded sector. No te 
that W>WY and denotes the unemployed. 
For the capital market , w e assume that capital is whol ly from foreign 
direct inves tment and is f reely mobi le be tween sectors so that rental rates in 
both sectors are equalized. In the wor ld market , the rate of return on capital 
is r*. However , capital is subject to a tax rate of r in domest ic country 
and hence , the cost o f capital wi th in domest ic boundary, r , is " (1 + r ) . 
Cons ide r the demand side of the economy. A representat ive consumer 
is a i m at max imiz ing utility, U{D^,DY), subject to a budget constraint , 
w h e r e D, is the consumpt ion demand fo r good / . The solution to this 
op t imiz ing p rob lem yields the indirect utility funct ion, V{p,l), where p 
is the relat ive pr ice of good X (the pr ice of t raded good Y equals unity) and 
I deno te s income. 
A quasi - l inear utility funct ion , U { D ^ . D y ) - ) + D Y is used so 
tha t i ncome e f fec t c a n b e ignored.^^ This gives rise to the d e m a n d func t ion 
fo r good X : p = p ( D j ^ ) , whe re p ( P x � = d u i f i x � / d D ^ with p ' { D j ^ ) < 0 . 
In equi l ib r ium, the marke t supply X m u s t meet the market demand for the 
22 We follow Konishi, et al (1990) and Chao and Yu (1994). 
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non-traded good, that is, X = This yields the inverse demand function 
of good X: p = p{x), with p'{x)<0. The price of the non-traded good, 
p，is endogenously determined according to this inverse demand function. 
Since both sectors exhibit constant returns to scale, and the market is 
perfectly competitive, their unit costs should be equal to their unit prices. So, 
we have the following equations: 
(2) 
C > ” r ) = l (3) 
where C" is the unit cost function for sector J . 
Next, we consider the factor markets to conduct a comparative-static 
analysis in the general-equilibrium setting. According to Shephard's lemma, 
the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to factor prices yield 
factor demands. Using this approach, full employment of workers and 
capital in the host country can be expressed by 
(1 + (w, r)x + C: (wy ,r)7 = Z (4) 
+ = (5) 
where Cl = dC�I dw and C / ^dC^ I dr are unit labor and capital 
requirements for sector j respectively. 
By comparing the conditions of full employment of factors of 
production in equations (4) and (5) with those in the equations (3) and (4) in 
Chapter 3，we observe that the condition of full employment of capital in 
equation (5) in this chapter is the same as that in equation (4) in Chapter 3. 
However, the unit labor employment for the non-traded sector in equation (4) 
is multiplied with an additional term, l + A. It is due to the existence of 
unemployment in the labor market. If full employment can be attained so 
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that A is equal to zero, equation (4) will be just the same as equation (3) in 
Chapter 3. 
To explore the effect of an increase in the capital tax on the production 
of the non-traded good, we differentiate equation (2) and get 
X = - s G f ^ T (6) 
where e = -p! p'X is the price elasticity of demand and 
is the cost share of capital for the non-traded sector. It is observed from this 
equat ion that an increase in the capital tax affects the output of the 
non-traded good adversely. Furthermore, the output effect in equation (6) 
does not depend on factor intensity while that in equation (6) of Chapter 3 
does. We can explain this by comparing the unit cost function in equation (2) 
wi th that in equation (1) of Chapter 3. The output of the non-traded sector is 
determined by the unit cost which depends on the offsetting effects between 
the changes in wage and the rental rate for an increase in capital tax. If the 
decrease in wage is relatively larger (smaller) than the increase in the rental 
rate, unit cost should decrease (increase). However, the wage is f ixed under 
the min imum wage policy, meaning that the unit cost function in equation (6) 
is virtually a funct ion of the rental rate only. The output of the non-traded 
sector should depend only on the rental rate but not the relative value of 
wage and the rental rate. 
To identify the various effects of the capital tax, it is useful to f ind the 
cost effect on outputs. We begin with the relation between wage and the 
capital tax. Let " a " be the percentage change of the variable. 
51 
Differentiating equation (3), we get 
w y i T ^ - e ^ i e ^ y < 0 (7) 
where 沒灯 = C l r l C ^ and 民y = C^Wy IC^ are the cost shares of capital 
and labor for the traded sector respectively. We can see that Wy and r 
should move in opposite direction so as to maintain the zero profit condition 
in the traded sector. 
We move on to find an expression which links up the changes in 
unemployment , outputs and foreign capital inflows. Differentiating 
equations (4) and (5)，and using equation (7) yields: 
(1 + 义)/l以 X+ ；A1+ A, , r = [ ( l - o r , 一 ( 1 + A K O k x ^ u c ] ^ (8) 
入KX Y-K* = [(CT广l)^灯义灯-Gkx^KX (9) 
where g^ = C ^ C ^ I C l C i is the elasticity of factor substitution, 
Jljy = j C i I K * and 义以 = j C i ! L are the capital and labor shares of 
sector j respectively. Equation (8) states that an increase in capital tax 
affects outputs and unemployment ratio adversely if the elasticity of factor 
substitution for the traded sector is larger than unity. Moreover, it is shown 
in equation (9) that an increase in capital tax leads to smaller outputs but 
more inflows of foreign capital if the elasticity of factor substitution of the 
t raded sector is smaller than unity. 
Finally, we will explore the impact of an increase in the capital tax on 
the unemployment ratio by differentiating equation (1) and using equation 
(7)： 
/1沒1^义=(1 + > 0 ^灯？ (10) 
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F r o m the above equat ion, w e can see that an increase in the capital tax will 
a f fec t the unemploymen t rate adversely. 
5.3 Comparative Static Analysis 
A f t e r const ruct ing a model in which sectoral unemployment is prevalent , it 
is t ime to invest igate the ef fec ts of an increase in the capital tax on outputs , 
domes t i c we l fa re and unemployment ratio. With the imposit ion of capital 
tax, it is be l ieved that inf lows of foreign capital will be discouraged. Chao 
and Yu (1997) convey that an increase in the capital tax on fore ign direct 
inves tment will a lways lead to a contraction in foreign capital inf lows when 
the re is sectoral unemployment . We wou ld like to see if the same result can 
b e obta ined by us ing equat ions (6), (8)，（9) and (10):^^ 
K't T = {Uj^ [{cry - i K A y + (1 + 也 义 L Y ] 
—S0KX 入0LY [(1 + 义AT — ^LY ^ KX ] 
+ ^Oj^yOj^ [(1 + 一 ^LY^KX ]}/ A (11) 
w h e r e A = 一又A^y < 0 . 
F r o m the stability condi t ions, w e ascertained that cry > 1 
AjryAj^ + and A^y 义j^： < ( 1 +义)；1 灯;I辽(j；^^ .24 The condi t ion 
tha t > + m e a n s that sector X is capital intensive. ^ ^ 
T h e concep t of fac tor intensity was formal ized by Samuelson (1953-54) and 
popular ized by Jones (1965). A s w e can see, the numerator of equat ion (11) 
is larger than ze ro by uti l izing the stability condit ions. So w e can conclude 
23 See Appendix VHI. 
24 See Appendix IX. 
“ T h i s is a generalization of the Khan (1980) and Neary (1981) stability condition for 
the mobile-capital Harris Todaro economy. 
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A A 
that K*Lr < 0 . As a result, the following proposition follows: 
Proposition 5.1 Under the Harris-Todaro economy, an increase in the 
capital tax decreases the inflows of foreign capital 
From equation (2), we see that unit cost of the non-traded sector is a 
function of the fixed wage and cost of capital. As a result, an increase in the 
capital tax increases the unit cost of the non-traded sector, which will 
hamper the use of capital. Recall that we also conveyed in Chapter 3 that 
inflows of foreign capital are discouraged. It means the existence of 
sector-specific unemployment does not quantitatively alter the effect of an 
increase in capital tax on foreign capital. 
Next, we will move to investigate the effects of an increase in the 
capital tax on the outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors. Solving 
equations (6)，（8)，（9) and (10), we have 
XIT = S0KX 入 SLY 入LY/A (12) 
y/ T = -[Jl0,y A,y 0,y (l " O", ) " ^ + A)^ 灯 
- ( 1 + ；I辽 e]/ A (13) 
From equation (12), we observe that the denominator is negative while the 
terms in the numerator are positive. As a result, we can conclude that 
A A 
X / t <0. This gives Proposition 2: 
Proposition 5.2 When there is sector-specific unemployment, the 
imposition of the capital tax hampers the production of the non-traded 
goods regardless of the factor intensity of this sector. 
As shown in equation (2)，the unit cost of the non-traded good should be 
equal to its unit price which is determined endogenously under the condition 
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that its market supply should be equal to its market demand. The capital tax 
increases the domestic cost of using capital. For the non-traded sector, unit 
cost of this sector is a function of fixed wage and the cost of capital. As a 
result, an increase in the cost of capital pushes up its unit cost 
unambiguously. Since the profit maximization condition of firms is that unit 
cost equals unit price, an increase in the capital tax should be accomplished 
with an increase in the price. The demand for non-traded good should be 
reduced and so does its supply. 
We can then ascertain the output effect in the traded sector from 
equation (13). It is observed that the numerator will be positive if > 1. 
The condition that cr^ > 1 is obtained by the stability condition. So we 
A 八 
have 7 / r < 0 . As a result. Proposition 3 follows: 
Proposition 5.3 An increase in the capital tax decreases the output of the 
traded sector when the non-traded sector is characterized by sector-specific 
unemployment. 
From equations (11) and (12), we ascertained that capital inflows are 
discouraged and factors of production are released from the non-traded 
sector due to the slumping production in this sector. The capital released 
f rom the non-traded sector may not be enough to cover the depressed flows 
of capital from foreign countries, meaning that the producers in the traded 
sector should use labor to substitute capital. However, labor are not willing 
to work in the traded sector due to the decreased wage there. As a result, the 
production of the traded sector decreases. 
The output effect of the traded sector depends on the factor intensity of 
both traded and non-traded sector in Chapter 3 but under Harris-Todaro 
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economy, this effect is no longer governed by the factor intensity. 
After investigating the effect of an increase in capital tax on the supply 
of both goods and foreign capital inflows, it is time to shed some light on 
the problem that is most worried by policy makers. That is the 
unemployment ratio. We can obtain the effect of an increase in the capital 
tax on unemployment under trade liberalization by solving equations (6), (8), 
(9) and (10): 
= -(1 + 义 灯 ; ( 1 4 ) 
From equation (14)，it is observed that the both denominator and numerator 
A A 
are negative and so AJr > 0 . The following proposition is implied: 
Proposition 5.4 Under the Harris-Todaro economy, an increase in the 
capital tax worsens the unemployment ratio when the market is 
characterized by perfect competition. 
With the decrease in the supply of the non-traded good, labor will be 
released f rom this sector. This pushes down the wage rate in the traded 
sector. Thus, labor in the traded sector will migrate to the non-traded sector 
where they can find higher wage but some of them cannot get jobs there. 
Both factors contribute to the rise in the unemployment ratio. This result is 
similar to that of Gupta (1995) who says that capital tax can aggravate the 
unemployment ratio if wage subsidy is financed by the capital tax but is in 
contrast with those of Chao and Yu (1997) who prove that nonzero optimal 
capital taxes coupled with a tariff can reduce sector-specific unemployment. 
Moreover, Michael and Miller (1994) show that an export subsidy or a 
subsidy on labor and capital for the sector without unemployment can 
alleviate unemployment, whereas subsidies on labor or capital in the sector 
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with unemploymen t will m a k e unemployment become more serious. 
5.4 Welfare Analysis 
H a v i n g invest igated the ef fec ts o f an increase in the capital t ax on sectoral 
outputs , fore ign capital in f lows and the unemployment rate, w e are n o w 
ready to explore h o w domest ic wel fa re will be affected. Khan (1982) and 
Gr inols (1991) have examined the effects of foreign capital inf lows for a 
genera l ized Harr is-Todaro economy under tar iff protection. Khan shows that 
w h e n impor ts are subject to tariff , more foreign capital inf lows intensify the 
tar i f f distort ion and hence reduce national welfare. Grinols argues that 
increased foreign capital need not be detrimental to wel fare if the 
oppor tuni ty costs of labor are sufficiently low. Here, w e would like to see if 
it is l ikely that capital tax causes ha rm to welfare , as conveyed in the studies 
o f K h a n and Grinols. We start by def ining income, /，of domest ic residents 
as fo l lows: 
I ^ w L x - ¥ W y L y + r * K * T (15) 
T h e first t e rm of equat ion (15) is the total salary received by labor w h o 
w o r k s in the non- t raded sector. They receive a wage oiw and there are L^ 
labor in this sector. So the total wage earned is wL^ . The second te rm of 
equa t ion (15) denotes wage income in the t raded sector. The last t e rm of the 
express ion is capital t ax revenue collected by the nat ive country. 
N o t e that the change in nat ional income, dl, can be obtained by 
d i f ferent ia t ing equa t ion (15) 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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dl ： Xp�dX - WyL^dX + r*idK* (16) 
The indirect utility, V = is expressed as the function of price ratio 
of the non-traded good to the traded good and income of the domestic 
residents. Differentiating the indirect utility function, we get 
dV = Vpp'clX + VjdI (17) 
where V^ = dV / dp . Note that Vj =dV / dl is the marginal utility of 
income, which is unity under the separable utility function. Equation (17) 
can be written as^^ 
dV = -Xp'dX + dI (18) 
Putting equation (16) into equation (18)，we get 
dV = r*tdK* -WyL^d^, (19) 
Equation (19) is useful in evaluating the welfare impact of foreign capital 
inflows. The first term on the right hand side of equation (19) corresponds to 
the welfare effect of foreign capital inflows under perfect competition. The 
second term captures the welfare effect of unemployment. From equation 
(11)，it is concluded that dK* / ( h <Q while we get the result that 
dXIdr > 0 in equation (14). Consequently, the sign of dVIdv is negative. 
The following proposition is implied: 
Proposition 5.5 When both sectors are characterized by perfect 
competition，an increase in capital tax is welfare-decreasing under the 
Harris-Todaro economy. 
This result is similar to that from Michael and Miller (1994) who say that a 
capital subsidy in agriculture will raise social welfare and we find that an 
increase in capital tax will deteriorate welfare. We can view an increase in 
27 By Roy's identity, X = 
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capital tax as a decrease in subsidy and so our findings can be rephrased as 
that an increase in capital subsidy will enhance welfare. 
Brecher and Alejandro (1977) show that when imports are subject to 
tariffs, an introduction of foreign capital inflows intensify the tariff 
distortion and hence reduces national welfare if the importing-competiting 
sector is relatively capital intensive. Chao and Yu (1997) convey that a 
capital subsidy can maximize domestic welfare when there is a tariff. Dei 
(1985) shows that when imports are restricted by quotas, foreign capital 
inf lows in the presence of foreign-owned capital always improve welfare by 
decreasing the rental rate and so lowering the payments to existing 
fore ign-owned capital. The aforementioned studies mainly convey the idea 
that capital tax is welfare-reducing under the Harris-Todaro economy, which 
is the same as the welfare effect of capital tax obtained here. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of an increase in capital tax on 
outputs, inf lows of foreign capital and unemployment ratio by constructing 
an analytical model in which the labor market is characterized by sectoral 
unemployment and there are two sectors, the traded and the non-traded 
sector. The results can be summarized as follows: 
Since the unit cost of the non-traded sector is a function of rigid wage 
and cost of capital, an increase in capital tax should rise the unit cost of the 
non-traded sector and so as the price of the non-traded good. Demand for 
the non-traded good decreases because of the higher price. Fewer 
non-traded goods should be produced to attain goods market equilibrium, 
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meaning that labor and capital are released from this sector. 
The capital released f rom the non-traded sector is not enough to cover 
the smaller amount of capital inflows in the traded sector. Moreover, labor 
are not willing to work in the traded sector because of the decreased wage. 
Both factors contribute to the depressed production in the traded sector. 
Unemployment becomes more serious when there is an increase in the 
capital tax. Labor are released from the non-traded sector due to the 
deteriorating demand for the non-traded good. The released labor are not 
will ing to work in the traded sector since the wage in this sector has 
decreased. All these factors intensify the unemployment ratio instead of 
alleviating it. 
Finally, it comes to the most important issue, welfare. It can be shown 
that the effect of an increase in capital tax on domestic welfare is governed 
by the effect of an increase in capital tax on foreign capital inflows and that 
on the unemployment rate. We show that both factors hamper domestic 
welfare . As a result, an increase in capital tax is welfare-decreasing when 
sector-specific unemployment is introduced. 
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Chapter 6 
Capital Taxation and Unemployment under 
Imperfect Competition 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapte r 5，we have explored the wel fare effect of capital taxation when 
bo th sectors are under perfect competi t ion and there is sector-specific 
unemployment . It was shown that an increase in the capital tax is 
welfare-reducing. However , industries are seldom characterized by perfect 
compet i t ion. As a result, previous analysis seems to be unrealistic and can 
hardly be comparab le with the situation of the real world. 
A s a result, it is crucial to explore the issue when not all sectors are 
under perfect competi t ion. Here , we assume that the non-traded sector is a 
monopol i s t whi le the t raded sector remains to be perfectly competitive. 
In Chapte r 4，we have explored the welfare and output effects when 
fore ign capital in f lows are taxed and product ion activities are under 
imper fec t competi t ion. In Chapter 5，we investigated the effect of the capital 
t ax on wel fa re and output of the domest ic country where there is 
sector-specif ic unemployment in the non-traded sector and both sectors are 
under perfec t competi t ion. In this chapter, w e will try to combine these two 
dis tor t ions to see what will happen to the welfare and outputs. 
The re is s o m e literature that demonstrates the welfare effect of 
international capital mobil i ty when the market structure and labor market 
are character ized by imperfec t competi t ion and sector-specific 
61 
u n e m p l o y m e n t respectively. Lai (1995) shows that international capital 
mobi l i ty lowers we l fa re of a country fac ing sector-specific unemployment 
and t rade restrictions. C h a o and Yu (1994) consider similar issue as Lai but 
they pe r fo rm bo th short and long run analysis. They investigate the ef fec t of 
capi tal mobi l i ty on unemploymen t and domest ic welfare when product ion 
act ivi t ies are under imperfect competi t ion and there is sector-specific 
unemploymen t . They start the short-run analysis that capital is immobi le 
b e t w e e n sectors. Later on, they per fo rm the long-run analysis by a l lowing 
capital mobi l i ty and show that when unemployment prevails in the 
manufac tu r ing sector, foreign capital inf lows raise the manufactur ing output 
in t he short and long run. Moreover , it is conveyed that when capital 
mobi l i ty is a l lowed, there is an increase in the unemployment rate in the 
short run but a d rop in it in the long run. They fur ther show that inf lows of 
fo re ign capital wil l improve the wel fa re in the short run if unemployment is 
ins igni f icant whi le they wil l b e a lways welfare-enhancing in the long run. In 
thei r studies, fo re ign capital inf lows are not subject to any taxes. So, it 
w o u l d b e crucial to int roduce a capital t ax to their models. 
6.2 The Model 
We cons ider a s imple two-sector economy in which sectoral unemployment 
a n d imper fec t compet i t ion prevail . This country produces two goods: the 
non- t raded good (X) and the t raded good (Y). Both goods are produced by 
us ing labor and capital . T h e supply of labor depends on the populat ion of 
domes t i c residents , L，which is fixed whi le that of capital depends entirely 
on the in f lows o f fo re ign capital，AT The product ion funct ions of the two 
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sectors are: where L and K, 
denote the labor and capital employed by s ec to r i , i=X,Y, respectively. 
Here，instead of receiving the same wage，labor in both sectors are 
rewarded with different wages due to the prevalence of a fixed minimum 
wage in the non-traded sector where labor are receiving a higher wage than 
those in t raded sector in which wage is flexible. Labor in both sectors are 
paid according to their values of marginal product of labor. 
Labor migrate to the non-traded sector due to the higher wage received 
there but not all of them can find jobs in the non-traded sector, implying that 
unemployment persists there. The traded sector will not suffer f rom 
unemployment since wage is flexible in that sector. We define 入=LJ L^ 
as the unemployment ratio so that 1 + 义 is the probability of f inding a j o b 
in the non-traded sector. When the process of migration continues, the value 
o f marginal product of labor in the traded sector increases due to the fact 
that f ewer labor stay in this sector. This makes the wage in this sector rise. 
The Harr is and Todaro (1970) equilibrium condition conveys that the 
expected wage in the non-traded sector should be equal to the wage in the 
t raded sector so that no more migration will be observed. This condition can 
be descr ibed by the fol lowing equation: 
+ vt/j, (1) 
where w is the f ixed wage rate in the non-traded sector and Wy is the 
wage rate in the traded sector. 
For the capital market , w e assume that capital is wholly f rom foreign 
direct investment. In the world market , the rate of return on capital is r \ 
However , capital is subject to a tax rate of T in domestic country. The cost 
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of capital within domestic boundary is hence = " (1 + r ) , 
For the demand side, to ease our analysis, we follow Konishi et al and 
Chao and Yu (1994) by choosing a quasi-linear utility function; that is, 
U(Px，Dy ) = u ( P x . This gives rise to the demand function for good 
X : p = p ( Z ) ; J ， w h e r e p{Px、： M p ^ � /奶 乂 . Note that A 
representative consumer wishes to maximize this simplified utility function, 
subject to a budget constraint. The indirect utility function of the domestic 
residents, which is the solution of this optimizing problem, is represented as 
V { p j ) where p is the relative price of the non-traded good to the traded 
good (price of the traded good is unity) and I is the income of domestic 
residents. In equilibrium, the market supply X must meet the market 
demand for the non-traded good, that is X = This yields the inverse 
demand funct ion of good X: p = p{x) with p'{x) < 0 . Because good X 
is non-traded, its price is endogenously determined. 
W h e n the traded sector is under perfect competition, its unit cost 
should be equal to unit price so as to make zero profit. Then we have 
C'(wy,r)=l (2) 
where C^ is the unit cost function for the traded-sector. 
To identify the various effects of the capital tax, it is useful to f ind the 
cost effect on outputs. We begin with the relation between wage and capital 
tax by differentiat ing equation (2): 
: " “ h 9 灯 ( 3 ) 
where ( 9 灯 = C j r / C ^ and = C^Wy / C^ are the cost shares of capital and 
labor for the traded sector respectively. The result in equation (3) is 
plausible since the condition that unit price of the traded sector equals unity 
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should b e mainta ined. 
Fo l lowing C h a o and Yu (1997) about the total cost funct ion of industry 
wh ich is under imperfec t compet i t ion, w e def ine the total cost funct ion of 
the non- t raded sector, C ^ a s m{w,r)x + where m{) and 
F(-) represent the marginal cost and quasi-f ixed cost respectively. The 
exis tence o f the quasi - f ixed cost operates increasing returns to scale for the 
monopol i s t . ^^ For simplicity, marginal c o s t，m ( . ) , is assumed to be 
independen t o f X.^^ This total cost funct ion is used because it captures the 
character is t ic o f the monopol is t and at the same t ime simplifies our analysis 
because o f the assumpt ion that marginal cost is independent of X. The profit , 
71，of the monopol i s t in sector X is s imply equal to its total revenue minus 
total cost: 
= p { x ) X - m { ^ , r ) x - F ^ , r ) (4) 
T h e prof i t max imiza t ion condi t ion of the non-traded sector is obtained by 
d i f fe ren t ia t ing equat ion (4) with respect to X and setting it to be zero: 
p{x)+ pix)x = (5) 
T h e revenue o f the monopo ly is p{x)x and so the marginal revenue 
is p{x)-\- p\x)x • T h e prof i t maximiza t ion condi t ion for the monopol is t is 
that the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
To ascer ta in the impact of the capital t ax on the output of the 
non- t raded sector, w e different iate equation (5) to get 
{2-E)X = (6) 
28 The quasi-fixed cost in producing good X is also the barrier of entry. This is 
consistent with the assumption of monopoly in the non-traded sector. 
We follow Konishi, et al, and Suzumura (1990) to adopt this simplifying specification. 
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where e = -Xp��丨p�is the inverse of elasticity of the slope of demand for 
sector X，b = mlp is the ratio of marginal cost to price for sector X, 
e = - p l p � X is the price elasticity of demand for sector X and 
OZi = rn^r lm is marginal cost share of capital. 
For conducting a comparative-static analysis in the general-equilibrium 
setting, we need to turn to the factor markets. According to Shepard's 
lemma, the partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to factor 
prices yield factor demands; for example, L^ = + . 
Using this approach, full employment of workers and the distribution of 
capital can be expressed by the following two equations: 
= L (7) 
m^X + F ^ + C l Y (8) 
wherem^. =dmldj ,C] --dC^ Idj and Fj = d F I d j = w,r. 
Equations (1)，（2)，（4)，(7) and (8) have demonstrated the model in 
which there is sector-specific unemployment and the market structure is 
imperfectly competitive. We can say that this model is the generalized 
version of those in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This profit maximization condition 
is similar to that in Chapter 4. However, the wage of the non-traded sector in 
Chapter 4 is flexible. To replicate the profit maximization condition in 
Chapter 3, we have to put p[x)+ p'{x)x and as p{x) and 
respectively where c ^ is the unit cost function for the 
non-traded sector when it is under perfect competition and w is the wage 
prevalent between sectors when there is no unemployment. Similarly, the 
profit maximization condition in Chapter 5 can be regenerated by replacing 
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p(x)-\- p'{x)x and m{w,r) by p{x) and respectively. 
Next, we will compare the conditions of full employment of factors of 
production in this chapter with the ones in other chapters. The full 
employment of factors of production conditions in Chapter 3 can be 
regenerated by letting, m^X + = c^ , m^X + cf {w, r) and 
A = 0 in equations (7) and (8)，where dc^ /dw and 
cf (M^，r)= dc'"^ I dr are the unit labor and capital requirements of sector X. 
The full employment conditions in Chapter 4 can be obtained by putting 
A = 0 and w = Finally, by replacing m ^ X + F^ and m^X + F^ with 
and in equation (7) and (8) respectively, the model in 
Chapter 5 can be obtained. 
To f ind the link between outputs and unemployment, we differentiate 
equation (7) and use equation (3): 
(1 + 傘:Y ；I以 A 1+ A d , Y = 一[(1 + / i K E^ ；I以 + E^, {(7y - I)]T 
(9) 
where / l ^ = M^X / L is the marginal labor share of sector X，Z^j is the 
labor share for sector j and cr, = C二 C V / Q j C / is the elasticity of factor 
substitution for sector j . We can see that the effects of an increase in the 
capital tax on the supply of both sectors and unemployment ratio depend on 
whether the elasticity of factor substitution for the traded sector is greater 
than unity or not. If it is greater than unity, an increase in capital tax will 
decrease sectoral outputs and unemployment. Next we find an equation 
linking up outputs and foreign capital inflows by differentiating equation (8) 
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and us ing equa t ion (3): 
义AT K* - -\0ioc j^CT + 0 ~ ^r 义kt (10) 
w h e r e A!^’ = m^X! K* is the marginal capital share for sector X. From this 
equa t ion , w e observe that if the elasticity of factor substitution for the traded 
sector is smal le r than unity, a rise in capital tax brings about detrimental 
e f fec t s to outputs but encourages inf lows of foreign capital. 
Finally, w e shi f t to explore the impact of an increase in the capital tax 
on u n e m p l o y m e n t by different ia t ing equat ion (1): 
= + (11) 
It can be seen that an increase in the capital tax will make unemployment 
b e c o m e m o r e serious since 没 让 , a n d X are greater than zero. 
6.3 Comparative Static Analysis 
A f t e r set t ing u p equat ions for the model in Section 6.2，it is t ime to 
inves t iga te the e f fec t s of an increase in capital tax on sectoral outputs, 
i n f l ows o f fo re ign capital and unemployment ratio. The cost of production 
m a y b e increased a f te r an increase in capital tax, which will discourage the 
use o f capital . The re may b e f ewer capital inflows. As a result, it is crucial to 
exp lo re the e f fec t o f an increase in capital tax on capital inflows. From the 
sys tem of equa t ions (6), (9)，(10) and (11), w e 
+ (2-epLY^Kx K t ^ X ( l + 义)一^Kx. 
+ (12) 
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where A = (2 - > 0 since 2>e 
From equation (12)，the denominator and G' are always greater than zero. 
The numerator will be positive if > 1 and A^ > ^KX /(I + 义)义灯• The 
conditions mean that if the elasticities of factor substitution in the traded and 
non-traded sectors can be greater than unity and 义jcsr/(1 +义)义灯 
respectively, then numerator will be greater than zero. If both conditions 
A A 
mentioned can be fulfilled, we have K*IT < 0. Then, the following 
proposition follows: 
Proposition 6.1 When the non-traded sector is under imperfect 
competition and labor market is characterized by sector- specific 
unemployment, foreign direct investment is discouraged by an increase in 
the capital tax if the elasticities of factor substitution for the traded and 
non-traded sectors are greater than unity and /(I + 义)Aj^  respectively. 
This result is of a little bit different from those in Chapters 4 and 5. We 
convey that inflows of foreign capital are discouraged when either 
sector-specific unemployment or imperfect competition exists. However, 
when both distortions are present, it is observed that the effect of an increase 
in capital tax is governed by the elasticities of factor substitution in both 
sectors. By observing equation (12)，we can find that the uncertainty of the 
sign of this equation is due to the coexistence of X and 2-e. However, 
when either term disappears, as shown in equation (20) in Chapter 4 and 
equation (11) in Chapter 5, the effect of an increase in capital tax on inflows 
of foreign capital becomes unambiguous. 
After ascertaining the effect of an increase in the capital tax on foreign 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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capital inflows, it is time to explore the output effect. The effect of an 
increase in the capital tax on outputs can be obtained by using equations (6)， 
(9), (10) and (11): 
X l T = - e ' ^ b e l { 2 - e ) < 0 (13) 
Y! t = -{2- [(l + ^ >7；, 
+ + (14) 
From equation (13) and the stability condition/^ we know that 2-e is 
A A 
greater than zero and hence XI r < 0 . B y dividing equation (13) with 
A A 
equation (12), we can demonstrate that XIK* >0 when cfv > 1 and 
> Xf^ /(I + . This result is consistent with that ascertained by Chao and 
Yu (1994) who claim that inflows of foreign capital raise output of the sector 
which is under increasing returns to scale. Then, the following proposition 
follows: 
Proposition 6.2 When the labor market and the non-traded sector are 
characterized by sector-specific unemployment and operated by a 
monopolist respectively，an increase in capital tax will hamper the 
production of the non-traded sector. 
We find that the production of X in equation (13) does not depend on the 
factor intensity. We can explain this result by using equation (5) which 
shows the profit maximization condition of the monopolist. The marginal 
cost function depends only on the rental rate of capital because of fixed 
wage in sector X. So, production of X is independent of the factor intensity. 
From equation (14)，we obtain the effect of an increase in the capital 
17 See Appendix VI. 
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A A 
tax on the traded good. Since 2 > e , we obtain that F / r < 0 if > 1. As 
a result, the following proposition is implied: 
Proposition 6.3 If the elasticity offactor substitution for the traded sector 
is greater than unity, then the production of the traded good is reduced for 
an increase in the capital tax. 
The explanation for Proposition 3 is that from equation (3), it is 
ascertained that wage for the traded sector decreases after an increase in 
capital tax. Labor in this sector will migrate to the non-traded sector and 
hope to find a higher pay. From the result above, we know that if > 1, 
foreign capital inflows are discouraged. So, a lack of labor supply in the 
traded sector cannot be substituted by foreign capital, meaning that the 
output of the traded good decreases inevitably. 
By comparing the output effects obtained from this chapter and those 
f rom Chapters 4 and 5, we can see how unemployment interacts with 
imperfect competition. The output effect of the non-traded sector in equation 
(13) is different f rom that in Chapter 4 where we ascertained that output of 
X will increase for a higher capital tax but here we just find the opposite. It 
is because the marginal cost in Chapter 4 depends only on wage while that 
in this chapter depends only on rental rate of capital. An increase in the 
capital tax raises the rental rate and decreases wage. As a result, marginal 
cost in Chapter 4 will decrease while the opposite happens in this chapter. 
Hence, the output of sector X increases in Chapter 4 but decreases in this 
chapter. Comparing the output effect in the non-traded sector in this chapter 
with that in Chapter 5, we find that they are just the same. As a result, the 
existence of sector-specific unemployment decreases output of the 
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non-traded sector under both perfect and imperfect competition. We then 
conclude that imperfect competition does not take a role in affecting the 
output from the non-traded sector in this chapter. 
The output effect in the traded sector is different f rom those in Chapters 
4 and 5 in which the production of Y is hampered. However, the output 
effect of the traded sector depends on whether factors in the traded sector 
are close substitutes after the introduction of imperfect competition into the 
sectoral unemployment. It means the coexistence of sectoral unemployment 
and imperfect competition makes the output effect of the traded sector 
become more ambiguous. 
The interaction of the sector-specific unemployment and imperfect 
competi t ion can be summarized as follows: 
W h e n sectoral unemployment exists, the output of the non-traded sector 
decreases. Hence, factors of production are released f rom this sector. The 
released labor are not willing to work in the traded sector due to the 
decreased wage in that sector. Hence, more workers become unemployed. 
With the introduction of imperfect competition, the inflows of foreign 
capital can decrease or increase, depending on the elasticities of factor 
substitution of the traded and non-traded sector. Producers of the traded 
sector can choose to utilize the unemployed workers or to employ foreign 
capital according the elasticity of factor substitution of the traded sector. 
Unemployment is one of the problems that policy makers want to solve. 
It is important to see whether an increase in capital tax can help combat the 
unemployment . Using the system of equation (6)，（9)，(10) and (11)，we get, 
= + / A > 0 (15) 
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Note that 2-e is positive from the stability conditions. So, unemployment 
rate should increase after there is an increase in the capital tax. Comparing 
equation (15) with equation (14) in Chapter 5, we find that one additional 
term, 2-e, is introduced in equation (15). If 2-e is greater than unity, 
we can convey that unemployment becomes more seritms after the 
introduction of imperfection competition into the sectoral unemployment 
when compared with that when only sectoral unemployment exists. If not, 
the coexistence of increasing returns to scale and sectoral unemployment 
can help combat unemployment. By dividing equation (15) with equation 
(12), we can see that H K* < 0 when Gy > 1 and > ^KX /(I + A)义灯. 
The unemployment effect just ascertained is similar to that in Chao and Yu's 
paper (1994) in which they claim that an increase in foreign capital inflows 
may decrease it unambiguously in the long run. In the long run, the 
monopolist should be able to adjust its production plant so that labor and 
capital can be close substitutes, i.e. <Jx and cr^ can be large. 
Proposition 6.4 When the labor market and the non-traded sector are 
under Harris-Todaro unemployment and operated by a monopolist 
respectively, an increase in capital tax will rise the unemployment ratio 
caused by rigid wage in the non-traded sector. 
From the results above, we know that labor are released from the 
non-traded sector for a rise in capital tax. However, due to the decreased 
wage in the traded sector, the released labor will not be willing to work in 
this sector and so as the labor who is working in this sector. This means 
more labor have become unemployed. 
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6.4 Welfare Analysis 
T h e a im of this chapter is to investigate the welfare effect of capital tax. The 
e f fec t s o f an increase in capital tax on outputs, foreign capital and 
u n e m p l o y m e n t rat io have been explored in Section 6.3. We are n o w ready to 
shi f t our analysis to the domest ic welfare , which is represented by the 
indirect utility funct ion, V { p j ) where p is the relative price of the 
non- t raded good and I is income of domest ic residents. Income of 
domes t i c residents are represented by 
I = wLj^ +WyLY + r*TK* + n (16) 
Workers in the t raded and non-traded sectors receive a wage of Wy and w 
respectively. A s a result, total wage contributing to labor force is 
WyLy + w L x since there are Ly and L^ in the traded and non-traded 
sector respectively. The capital tax received f rom foreign direct investment 
is remi t ted to the domest ic residents as a lump sum and is regarded as part 
o f thei r income.�）Prof i t s earned by the monopol is t who is also a resident of 
the domes t i c country are regarded as a part of income of residents. 
Di f fe ren t ia t ing equat ion (16) to get the change in national income as 
fo l lows : 
dl ^Xp'dX- WyL^dX + 从 (17) 
A f t e r t ak ing dif ferent ia t ion of the indirect utility funct ion and using equation 
(17)，we get 
dV = r*T dK*- WyL^dX + (/? - m)dX (18) 
We follow Hatzipanayotou and Michael's setting (1993) that tax revenue collected 
will be remitted to domestic residents to become part of the nation income. 
34 See Appendix XII. 
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Equat ion (18) shows the welfare impact of the capital tax. The first term on 
the r ight-hand side of equation (18) denotes the impact of the capital tax on 
tax revenue. The second term captures the welfare effect of changes in the 
unemploymen t ratio while the third term captures the profit effect caused by 
imper fec t competi t ion. From the result above, we can see that an increase in 
the capital tax decreases the production of X, which reduces domestic 
wel fare . This is because the lowered production of X increases average 
fixed cost of product ion of the monopolist . Also, the problem of 
sector-specif ic unemployment tends to be made serious after there is an 
increase in the capital tax. In Chapter 5, we also f ind that unemployment 
a f fec ts the wel fa re adversely when production is under perfect competition. 
Hence , the exis tence of unemployment brings about the detrimental effect to 
we l f a re no mat ter what market structure is prevalent. However, as shown in 
equat ion (18), the existence of the monopoly power worsens welfare. So we 
conc lude that the introduction of imperfect competi t ion to unemployment 
will even bring more detrimental effect to domestic welfare. This is because 
the exis tence of the distortion of imperfect competi t ion causes less supply in 
sector X，implying that labor will be released from sector X. However, the 
re leased labor cannot be absorbed by the t raded sector. This will make the 
p rob lem of unemployment b e c o m e more serious. The presence of 
unemploymen t leads to a decrease in wel fare because the unemployed 
popula t ion could actually work. 
Equa t ion (18) can be regarded as the generalized version of changes in 
we l f a re fo r the previous chapters. It shows h o w the introduction of different 
dis tor t ions af fec ts the domest ic welfare. The first te rm in equation (18) 
deno tes h o w change in capital tax affects the welfare through capital tax 
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revenue. Chapter 3 is f ree from distortions except the imposition of capital 
tax. Hence , only the first term in the equation (18) appears. In Chapter 4 
where imperfec t competi t ion is introduced, the third term exists to capture 
the fea ture that monopol is t sets unit price to be higher than the marginal cost. 
In Chapter 5, w e are back to perfect competi t ion but unemployment exists in 
the non- t raded sector. As a result, the second term appears but the third term 
is absent . 
A 八 A A 
From equat ions (13) and (15), we obtain A / r > 0 and XI r <0. From 
equat ion (12), it is observed that if 义^^  / 义灯(1 + A) < cr；^  and cTj. > 1 , 
A A 
K*IT < 0 . That means equat ion (18) is negative, implying that an increase 
in capital tax is welfare-reducing if the elasticities of factor substitution of 
bo th sectors are large enough. On the other hand, f rom equations (12) and 
(18)， w e can convey that dVI dK* > 0 when a> > 1 and 
( jx > ^Kx /(l + 义)义KT • This wel fa re effect is comparable with that in Chao 
and Yu (1994) under those conditions. They show that in the short run, if the 
unemploymen t ef fec t is insignificant, welfare will, jus t the same as in the 
long run, be improved under the inflows of foreign capital. 
By compar ing equat ion (27) in Chapter 4 and equation (18) in this 
chapter , w e f ind that the second term in equation (18) is the additional term 
a f t e r the introduction of the unemployment . In the absence of this term, we 
can see that dX I dr is posit ive f r o m equation (27) in Chapter 4，meaning 
the output e f fec t is beneficial to the wel fa re under ful l employment . 
However , it is observed that dX I dr becomes negative after the 
int roduct ion of unemploymen t as shown in equat ion (18). O n the other hand, 
w e found that unemployment will hamper welfare in Chapter 5. We 
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ascertained the same in this chapter. In addition, after the introduction of 
imperfec t competi t ion in this chapter, we have the additional term, 
(p 一 m)dX，in equation (18) when comparing with equation (19) in Chapter 
5. It is also conveyed that dXl dr is negative. As a result, it is ascertained 
that the introduction of imperfect competition under the Harris-Todaro 
economy will fur ther hamper welfare. In conclusion, imperfect competit ion 
and sector-specific unemployment are together to lower the welfare. 
6.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, w e have investigated the effect of a rise in capital tax on 
outputs , inf lows of foreign capital, unemployment and welfare in a 
general-equil ibr ium, imperfect competition model with sector-specific 
unemployment . 
In contrast to the favorable output effect of the non-traded sector in 
Chapte r 4，we find that the output of the non-traded good decreases with the 
capital tax. O n the other hand, the inflows of foreign capital decrease if the 
elasticit ies of factor substitution of the traded and the non-traded sectors are 
large enough. Although the output effect of the non-traded sector is 
unambiguous , that of the traded sector can be ascertained only when the 
elasticity of factor substitution for the traded sector is greater than unity. 
In addit ion, capital tax increases the unemployment ratio regardless of 
the nature of the market structure. Moreover, the introduction of the 
distort ion of imperfect competi t ion to sectoral unemployment may lessen or 
increase the extent of sectoral unemployment . The policy implication of 
domes t ic wel fa re is that capital tax is not desirable if the elasticities of factor 
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This thesis uses general equilibrium models, consisting of two sectors of 
production: the traded and non-traded sector. Both sectors employ labor and 
capital as the production factors. The supply of labor are fixed while that of 
capital depends entirely on foreign capital inflows. Commodity trade is free, 
but foreign capital inflows are subject to a capital tax. The aim of this thesis 
is to investigate the effects of an increase in the capital tax on outputs, 
foreign capital inflows, welfare and unemployment. 
Firstly, we start analyzing a benchmark case in Chapter 3 in which both 
sectors are under perfect competition. We have found that an increase in the 
capital tax discourages foreign capital inflows. On the other hand, it is 
observed that the output of the non-traded sector increases (decreases) if it is 
labor (capital) intensive. Moreover, the output from the traded sector 
decreases if it is capital intensive. Although the output effect of the traded 
sector is ambiguous when it is labor intensive, we can ascertain that the 
output f rom this sector will increase if the factor intensity effect is 
significant. Furthermore, it is observed that the capital tax is 
welfare-reducing, meaning that no capital tax is optimal. This result is 
consistent with that of Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1993). 
Next , we start to introduce distortions to our model. In Chapter 4, we 
assume that the non-traded sector is operated by a monopolist while the 
t raded sector remains to be under perfect competition. We also make an 
adjus tment to the total cost function of the monopolist by assuming that 
marginal cost and fixed cost depend only on wage and the rental rate 
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respectively. We have found that a rise in the capital tax hampers foreign 
capital inf lows as in Chapter 3. Outputs of the traded and non-traded sectors 
decrease and increase respectively. For the domestic welfare, it is 
ascer ta ined that capital tax can affect welfare beneficially and adversely. As 
result , an opt imal capital tax should be imposed to maximize welfare. This 
result is d i f ferent f r o m that of Guidotti (1991) who claimed that a capital 
subsidy should be imposed. 
In Chapter 5，we exert a distortion on the labor market by assuming 
that a rigid m i n i m u m wage is prevalent in the non-traded sector while 
flexible w a g e is a l lowed in the other sector. This idea is first developed by 
Harr is and Todaro (1970) who introduce a two-sector model within which 
labor in one sector are receiving a higher and f ixed wage than those in 
another sector due to the policy of min imum wage. For the market structure, 
w e a s sume both sectors are under perfect competition. It is ascertained that 
an increase in capital tax discourages foreign capital inflows and outputs of 
the t raded and non-traded sectors. Sector-specific unemployment has 
b e c o m e m o r e serious af ter an increase in the capital tax. Finally, it is found 
that the domest ic wel fa re is reduced for a higher capital tax under the Harris 
and Todaro economy. 
We have in t roduced distortions in market structure and labor market in 
Chap te r 4 and Chapter 5 respectively. These two distortions are then 
c o m b i n e d together to see h o w they interact in Chapter 6. The effect of an 
increase in capital tax on foreign capital inf lows are determined by the 
elast ici t ies of fac tor substi tution of both sectors. W h e n the elasticities of 
fac to r substi tut ion of the t raded and the non-traded sectors are large enough, 
the in f lows of fore ign capital will decrease. Output of the non-traded sector 
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decreases whi le the output effect of the traded sector is governed by its 
elasticity of factor substitution. If the elasticity of factor substitution in the 
t raded sector is greater than unity, the production of this sector will be 
discouraged. We found that the effect of an increase in capital tax on 
unemploymen t is jus t the same as that in Chapter 5 in which monopoly 
distort ion does not exist, i.e. unemployment has become more serious. 
Finally, it is ascertained that welfare will be even hampered further if 
sector-specif ic unemployment and imperfect competit ion coexist. 
To conclude, in contrast to the traditional results that capital subsides 
or capital taxes af fect domest ic welfare monotonically under imperfect 
compet i t ion and full employment , we find that an optimal capital tax is 
needed to max imize domest ic welfare under the distortion of imperfect 
compet i t ion. Traditional t rade models convey that an increase in foreign 
capital lowers domest ic welfare under the Harris-Todaro economy. However , 
w e f ind a novel result that decrease in inf lows of foreign capital lowers 
nat ional wel fa re w h e n there is a distortion to the labor market. With the 
imposi t ion of capital tax, the domest ic welfare is harmed to a greater extent 
a f t e r the introduct ion of imperfect competi t ion to the Harris-Todaro 
economy. Finally，it is found that the coexistence of sectoral unemployment 
and imperfec t compet i t ion may lessen or increase the extent of 
u n e m p l o y m e n t if the foreign capital is taxed. 
Al though distort ions to the labor market and market structure are 
inc luded in this thesis, it seems that our studies can only depict the real 
e c o n o m y to certain extent. We consider the welfare effect of capital tax 
unde r Harr is-Todaro mode l by assuming that labor are fixed. However, most 
o f the countr ies have their own immigrat ion policy. As a result, our analysis 
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can be extended to variable labor supply. On the other hand, this thesis only 
covers the distortion brought about by the monopolist while natural 
monopoly can seldom be found. Coumot competition or monopolistic 
competi t ion seems to be more common, meaning that our analysis should be 
developed to capture more types of imperfect competition. Moreover, 
uni form capital tax rate is applied here but in reality, different tax rates are 
appl ied to foreign capital. So our model can be extended to allow 
differentials be tween capital tax rates. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Comparative Static Analysis 
To get equations (9)，(11) and (13), we write equations (6) to (8) in a matrix 
as follow: 
0rY 0 0 1 X [£0' 
A A 
^LY ^UC ^LY 0 Y = A T 
A 
where 3 = (1 - + ^ lx {^ky^lx — ^ l y ^ k x ^ x ) and B = 
The determinant of the above 
matrix, A，is equal to - Oly ^ ly which is smaller than zero.. 
By using Crammer ' s rule, we get 
K"! T = OIY {Z 没灯 OJ^Y " 0 + ^LY ^KX ^LY X 沒AT ^IX 一 ^LY ^KX ) 
-义AT ^DC {^KY ^VC 肌 V ^ 
x/T^-selyA^LY^^^ 
Yir = -el, [e^e^yX^y(i-o-,)+ {e^^e^ 一 e ^ y O ^ c y ^ ) - 劝 ] / A 
Appendix II: Explanation of Factor Intensity 
We will explain why it implies that sector X and Y are labor (capital) 
intensive and capital (labor) intensive respectively when 0 is greater 
(smaller) than zero or X is greater (smaller) than zero. It is noted that 6 
can be written as O^^y^Lx {^ky I^ly 一 ^kx 丨 ^dc ) which can be expressed as 
Iw\Ky ILx - K ^ IL^) . Moreover, X can be written as 
L^Y ^LX i^fcr ! L^Y ! which can be expressed as 
{A^yA^L/K*XKy/Ly-K^/L^) If ( 9 > ( < ) 0 o r X>{<) 0 , t hen Ky IL^ 
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is greater (smaller) than K ^ I L ^ . That means sector X is labor (capital) 
intensive accordingly. 
Appendix III: Stability 
Following Chang (1981), the dynamic adjustment process for the supply 
side of the model is specified as follows: 
Y ^ a, 
w = aXc'^{w,r)X ^Cl{w,r)Y-I 
r =以4 [C^ (w, r)X + Cl {w, r)Y-K*\ 
where r = r ' ( l + r ) , a dot over the variable denotes the time derivative, and 
Qj ( j = 1 to 4) is the speed of the adjustment which is assumed to be 
positive. Quantities adjust in the goods markets whereas prices adjust in 
factor markets. 
Linearization of the differential equations around the equilibrium 
values about the above equations gives the following matrix: 
� 0 0 一 没 辽 - ^ K v i y 
X ^ ^ - � X 
w 义Lr ^LX w 
. 1 A 
r L义灯 几KX � 
where =/l以<9辽 > 0 , s : = ^uc^kx^x >0， 
S � =入 + ^KY^LY^Y > ^ a n d = ^KxOfj^ + 4了(9灯 > 0 . 
The D-stability (for all speeds of adjustment) of the original nonlinear 
system requires that every principal minor of odd order is nonnegative and 
every principal minor of odd order is nonpositive (Quirk and Saponsnik, 
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1968). Deno t ing the principal minor by ( i=l to 4)，the stability 
condi t ions require 
= = 0 , J^ - -OJ^Y^LY < 0 and 
J4 = I s{(7Y 一 l)(义at ^ L Y ^ L Y ^ K Y + ^LY ^ KY 义XT ^LY ) 
6 
Stability condi t ions require the signs of X and 6 should be the same, 
OTy > 1 ， G l y 0 k x O x - ^ k y ^ l x > 0 and cT^Oj^e^ -^ ly^kx > 0 • That 
m e a n s the non-traded sector can be capital or labor intensive and so as the 
t raded sector. 
Appendix IV: Comparative Static and Stability 
To get the equat ions (10) to (12), wri te equations (5)，(8) and (9) in a matr ix 
as fo l lows: 
r -.r A 1 
^Lr^LY 没Lr 义Lr ^ ^ C 
A A ^L^^LY ^LY^KY ^ = D T 
e,y {2-e) 0 0 [ - e j e _ 
w h e r e C = -[9LY^LY^KY" 0 + ^UC{^LY^KX^X ' ^ K Y ^ L K ) ] and D = 
- 0KY 义灯 ^LY 0 - )-知{^LY ^Kx 一 ^KY ^ uc ^ x)肌(1 determinant for the 
above matr ix , A , is -Oj^y^Aj^y i l -e ) . 
By us ing C r a m m e r ' s rule, w e get 
Y/ T = ely te el9,y {\-Gy) 
KvU ely K 义“ (2 - ELE,, e^A-e^ e^ B)]/ A 
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To convey the sign of A, we use stability condition. To focus on the 
features of imperfect competition and scale economics, we follow Konishi 
et al. (1990) by assuming that while the factor markets and the traded sector 
adjust instantly, the output of the non-traded sector adjusts slowing. The 
adjustment process for X is defined by 
X = p\p{x)^ Xp\x)-
where the dot represents the time derivative and p is the positive 
adjustment coefficient. 
Taking a linear approximation for the adjustment process around the 
equilibrium point, X*，we get 
X pl^4)\x)x XI elyX^^y 
To attain stability condition, X should be smaller than zero, implying that 
A should be smaller than zero since p'{x) is negative. If A is negative, 
e should be smaller than 2. 
Appendix V: Explanation of Factor Intensity 
We will explain why > (<) 0 or < (>) 0，sector X is said to be 
capital (labor) intensive in the value sense and physical sense at the margin. 
It is noted that 九 can be written as fe I^Zc-^ky' ^ l y )• The 
expression can be simplified to OiyO^ir/w^K'^/Llr-Ky/Ly) where 
K ^ and Z^ are capital and labor used as variable factors in sector X 
respectively. On the other hand, can be expressed as 
义灯又L fe / 义Lr —又Lr I ^ KY } which can be converted to 
X f ^ M " ^ ^ ! l ^ x - ^ Y I ^ Y ) - Here, ratio of variable factors is used in 
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sector X. So, the concept of marginal intensity has to be employed. If 
I L!"X-KY I Ly is positive (negative), sector X is said to be capital (labor) 
intensive. As shown in the expressions，it is observed that K"^ I - Ky I Ly 
is greater (smaller) than zero if either (<) 0 or 义讲 < (>)0 . 
Appendix VI: Comparative Static Analysis 
To obtain equations (20) to (22), write equations (17) to (19) in a matrix: 
0 o l T i l 八 A 
^LY^LX ^LY^LY 0 7 = G' T 
0 义灯 - i j K* i G _ 
where G '= [义议 + ^ l v ^ l y 0 一 )] and G = ^ky^ky {'^y 一 1)一 ^ nc and 
the value of the determinant. A , is - Q^Y ^ ^U (2 - e) . 
By using Crammer ' s rule, we get 
A A 
T = - 0 l y {[(2 - e ) - e ^ L X ^ K Y 
+ L^Y (2 - ？'^KY ^ KY ^ Y + K^X ^ 
XIT^ -KY^n^ix^uBl 0 
f / T = [0,y (2 -
To convey the sign of A , we use stability condition. To focus on the 
features of imperfect competition and scale economics, we follow Konishi 
et al. (1990) by assuming that while the factor markets and the traded sector 
adjust instantly, the output of the non-traded sector adjusts slowing. The 
adjustment process for X is defined by 
X - p\p{x)-^ xp'{x)- w(w)] where the dot represents the time derivative 
and p is the positive adjustment coefficient. 
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Taking a linear approximation for the adjustment process around the 
equilibrium point, X*，we get 
To attain stability condition, X should be smaller than zero implying that 
A should be smaller than zero since p ' ( x ) is negative. If A is negative, 
e should be smaller than 2. 
Appendix VII 
We explain why the monopolist should produce on the portion of demand 
curve that is elastic. For the monopolist, total revenue(77^) = pX and 
marginal revenue(爐）=p{x)-¥xp{x). We then get, MR = p ( l - V s � . 
Hence, the monopolist will choose the part that can give it the condition that 
marginal revenue is greater than zero. That is, ^ > 1. 
Appendix VIII: Comparative Static Analysis 
To get equations (11)，(12) and (13)，write equations (6)，(8), (9) and (10) in 
a matrix. 
_ 1 0 0 0 t x l 「 -妨AX ‘ 
(1 + ；0/1 以 Aj^ y 0 AA^ Y { ^ - o - Y K Y ^ l y ^ 
又AX 义灯 - 1 0 K* (cr^ - Aj^ -
_ 0 0 0 观 J ⑴ L (1 + 也 _ 
The determinate. A , of the above matrix is -WJ^Y^LY < ^ which is 
smaller than zero. By using Crammer ' s rule, we can 
A： 7 r = {/U灯[(cry - � + (1 + 义灯义lx . 
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一的KX 又沒LY [(1 + ^ MLX ^ KY 一 ^LY ^ KX . 
+ ^^LY^KX [(1 + 义^UC^X - ^LY^KX ] } / � 
A A 
XIT： = eGf^x XOj^Y ^ LY 丨 A 
yi T = (1 - ov ) - + 
- ( 1 + 义 )义仏而 ; I � f ] / A 
Appendix IX: Stability 
Following Chang (1981), the dynamic adjustment process for the supply 
side of the model is specified as follows: 
m = a, [c^^ + (wy, r)Y - L 
r =以 4 [c^ + C； {wy,r)Y-K\ 
where r - r*(l + r ) , a dot over the variable denotes the time derivative, and 
Qj is the speed of the adjustment which is assumed to be positive, y = 1 to 
4. Quantities adjust in the goods markets whereas prices adjust in factor 
markets. 
Linearization of the differential equations around the equilibrium 
values about the above equations gives the following matrix: 
V " ! � 0 0 - e u - ^ K r i Y 
X ^ 0 \ / s 0 X 
w L^Y (1 + 义)义lA^  w 
r 久KX ^KY^LY^Y �广 
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where = 义,^ Y + ^LY ^ L Y ， = (1 + ^KX ^LX + ^Y K^Y ^ LY and 
s-^  = Xf^Of^ + 入KY^KY. Here, Z is the unemployment rate which is a 
decreasing function of Wy and dX! dwy < 0 . 
The D-stability (for all speeds of adjustment) of the original nonlinear 
system requires that every principal minor of odd order is nonnegative and 
every principal minor of odd order is nonpositive (Quirk and Saponsnik, 
1968). Denoting the principal minor by J^ (i=l to 4), the stability 
conditions require: 
Jj = = 0 , J3 = -O^Y^ly < 0 
J4 - ^LY^KX [^LY^KX " (l + ^KY ^ LK ^^r ^ ^ + '^^KY ^LY ^ KY ^ LY Y ~ ^ 
-0 U ^KX ^KX 一 (1 + ^ MaT ^LX 厂义 1�0 
This implies A ^ y X^^ < + ^^KY ^LX ^X，义zr 义灯 > (1 +aMla：义灯 and 
Gy > \. 
Appendix X: Derivation of Equation (16) 
I = wL^ +WYLY + r*K*T (i) 
Differentiating equation (i) to get 
dl - wdLx + WydLy + Lydwy + r*(pdK* + K^dt) (ii) 
Equation (4) in Chapter 5 can be written as 
(1 + +Ly = Z (iii) 
Differentiating equation (iii), we get 
dLy = - { l + X)c lLx-LxdJ i (iv) 
Substituting equation (iv) into (ii) and using equation (1), we get 
dl -Lydwy - WyLj^dA + + K^dr) (v) 
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Differentiating equation (2), we get 
Kj , r*dT = Xp 'dX (vi) 
Differentiating equation (3)，we get 
Lydwy + r^Kydx - 0 (vii) 
Substituting equations (vi) and (viii) into equation (v), we get 
dl = Xp'dX- WyL^dX + r*tdlC 
Appendix XI: Comparative Static and Stability Conditions 
To get equations (12) to (14), write equations (6)，（9), (10) and (11) in a 
matrix: 
'2-e 0 0 0"! � -eyys ‘ 
0 Xj^ y A^A 0 Y ^ - (1 + ^ly - KY^H i^r " 0 ； 
^KX 义人T 0 - 1 1 “ ^KX^KX ~ (l 
_ 0 0 Wly 0 J [ (l + ^^Ky _ 
The determinant of，A, is ( 2 - . By Crammer 's rule, we get 
r i r = - 1 ) + G ' } 
+ (2 -e)9LY0Kx [义灯〜 ( 1 + 义)一 ^KX ： 
XlT^-e^b8l{2-e)<0 
Y! r = - ( 2 - [ ( 1 + X)cT,e^ + ( a , — 1)] 
where + > 0 
We can ascertain the sign of A by using stability condition. 
To focus on the features of imperfect competition and scale economics, 
we fol low Konishi et al. (1990) by assuming that while the factor markets 
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and the traded sector adjust instantly, the output of the non-traded sector 
adjusts slowing. The adjustment process for X is defined by 
X = p p{x)^ xp\x)-m{w,r)，where the dot represents the time 
derivative and p is the positive adjustment coefficient. Taking a linear 
approximation of this equation around the equilibrium point yields 
X^ fyp\x)x{:i-e)x 
Stability condition requires X being smaller than zero./7’(X) is smaller 
than zero due to demand function. As a result, e has to be smaller than 2. 
Appendix XII: Derivation of Equation (17) 
We get the following equation by differentiating equation (16) 
dl = wdL^ ^Lydwy ^WydLy¥r*[TdK'' (I) 
The full employment in labor market can be represented as 
=Z (II) 
Differentiating equation (II), we get 
dLy = - (1 + X)dLx - Lx dl (III) 
Substituting equation (III) into (I), we get 
dl =LydyVy + +K*dT)+d7i: (IV) 
Differentiating equation (3), we get 
Kyr*dT + LydWy = 0 (V) 
Differentiating equation (4)，we get 
d7r = p，XdX + pdX - mbr)dX - Xm,DT - F,DT (VI) 
Putting equations (V) and (VI) into (IV)，we get 
dl = Xp�dX - w.L^dX + r*zdK* +{p-m)dX (VII) 
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